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INTRODUCTION 
Poland is the largest and strategically crucial ally 
of the USSR in East Europe. It is also, during the present 
time least politically and economically stable country of the 
bloc. In addition to being a part of an ideologically 
cohesive (however not always uniform) alliance of communist 
nations, Poland has developed its own, independent and unique 
characteristics which set its political and socio-economic 
structure aside from the rest of the bloc. Despite strong 
J 
tendencies for generally similar designs in social transfor-
mation and constitutional regulation in all East European 
countries, the reality of indigenous differences among them 
has been hard to hide behind the rigid proclamations of 
official doctrines and the introduction of common "socialist" 
law. 
Poland's special position in the bloc is due not only 
to strategic, geographical or even immediate political 
influences. It results from powerful internal factors, among 
them the deeply ingrained traditions of nationalism, respect 
for civil liberties and a long history of struggle for 
independence. These and other indigenous characteristics 
became evident in the pattern of Polish state organization, 
including the communist period and can be traced through an 
analysis of modern constitutions of Poland. 
1 
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The period of ~ndependent political development, 
started in 1913, was interrupted when the country became the 
first battlefield of World War II. During 1918-1939 Poland 
belonged to a group of European nations which underwent a 
deep transformation of their political systems. Most of East 
Europe failed to preserve unstable parliamentary governments 
created after the conclusion of World War I. In Poland, a 
new concept of state-centered authoritarianism, during the 
1930s formed a basis for the anti-parliamentarian regime 
that fell in September 1939. 
The communist takeover, completed during 1944-47, did 
not result in a complete condemnation of the Polish past. 
While aiming at the elimination of the bourgeois elements, 
associated with the state structures of pre-war Poland the 
new regime attempted to incorporate some national and 
democratic traditions into the new system, giving them a new 
"true'' and ideologically determined meaning. Even if they 
managed to transform the whole political and socio-economic 
structure as well as redefine the role of state law, the 
communists had to come to terms with the Polish reality. 
•In the new charter the regime set out to deliver 
promises of a new type of democracy. This political system 
became popularly associated not with the ideas of communism, 
but with the promise of improvements in living conditions 
that no other political or economic structure in independent 
Poland has been capable of delivering. This turns out to be 
l.·n reason why the communists are being held accountable the ma 
in social opinion, not only for the forcibly imposed foreign 
political organization, but else for the failure to fulfill 
the program they set out to realize in Poland. The social 
and political transformation in the country very soon took on 
a unique national form which varies greatly from the pattern 
envisioned by the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. 
The 1952 Constitution of the Polish People's Republic 
(Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa) 1 , defining the political, 
social and economic structure of the state, was passed during 
a period when the uniform Stalinist model of "socialism" had 
been already accepted throughout the Soviet bloc. In the 
communist political system a constitution ceases to be only a 
legal document proscribing the rules of state organization 
and establishing the norms for the relationship between the 
citizens and the authorities. Such document is not limited 
to a declaration of supreme legal norms, but becomes "a 
reflection of the existing reality [as perceived by the 
rulers] and a means for further transformation of society" 
(Brzezinski, 1968:77). 
·According to Marxist interpretation the socialist 
constitution has three basic functions: 1) legal, as the 
basic law, 2) programmatic as a definition of goals for 
socialist development; and 3) educational, as a general 
directive for socialization (Sokolewicz, 1978: 56-58). The 
period of constitutional development in post-World War II 
Poland has been characterized by constant struggle between 
the party ideology on one hand, and the reality of political 
and socio economic change on the other. ~he need to achieve 
certain proclaimed goals of ''socialist ~onstruction" oftan 
collided with the necessity to acknowledge specific national 
conditions. The understanding of these factors could help 
explain the shifts in the Polish domestic policies which 
influence constitutional interpretation and determine the 
amendments in the text itself. 
The role of the present Polish Constitut~on is a 
function of both the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the 
policies of the Communist party which aim at transforming 
the society and securing power. Whil~ the ideology finds its 
reflection in the party program, it often stands in con-
tradiction with reality, promising more than can be achieved. 
The disappointing results may weaken the legitimacy of the 
regime, but since the party claims monopoly on the inter-
pretation of socio-economic development, failure could be 
attributed to the methods only. It cannot influence the 
goals, whose validity remain beyond challenge. They form a 
core of the constitutional order. 
The situation in which the legal function of the 
constitution coexists with its programmatic function creates 
an imbalance between the two. The goal-oriented activity of 
the state in practice takes precedent over pure rule 
application. Thus in the communist countries as a rule the 
,.., .;;..ai tinacy of task-achiever.ient" over corr.es the "legitimacy of 
_..L-.,., 
1 . " rula-c::imp iance (Rigby, 1982:12). In trying to justify 
their hold en power a communist party considers historical 
· l' m as a ~oc~r~n° super;or t~ bourgeo~~ olural 1_~t :nateria is,, , .,. - ·- .LL "' ... _ -~ .... _ _ _ _ 
democracy. The ~ext of a constitution as a normative 
statement in communist countries is designed for a society 
which allegedly has already been transformed, at least 
partially. The most important remnants of the bourgeois 
state are proclaimed to have been eliminated. However, as 
long as any socio-economic contradictions, reminiscent of the 
former structure exist, a struggle for further change becomes 
a priority of the regime. It can be constitutionally 
justified in the form of the programmatic provisions in the 
basic law. In the ideological context the legal norms become 
functional only under the specific conditions of the socially 
unified "socialist state". Hence, the constitutional 
development becomes a dynamic process with the party being an 
ultimate arbiter of the interpretation, practical application 
and reevaluation of the law. 
The political and economic crisis of the 1980s in 
Poland•presents a new complex dilemma for the communist 
rulers of that country. The uniqueness of the Polish 
situation is mainly due to the fact that the so-called 
"socialist renewal'' there has its real origins not in the 
reform from above or from abroad, such as the influence of 
Gorbachev's policies, but in the virtual collapse of the 
partY nuthori.ty during 1980/81, ::nder popular pressure. 
the atmosphere ~f economic refor~s and certain institutional 
S .:"\""\ t--i-.n !'rovernment ::::t., ... ,.,,-.t1,,,....- ~ t "'.·~"~- y become .:i •. ~ f~-ic1:l t change -·· _,,c ·_:! - ,_ ~ -'-'-"'--~~c -- ... _ '-'---~ ---
to distinguish between the ~pparent desire for ''liberaliza-
ticn'' and a tactical maneuver by the party, not the first o::e 
in Polish post-war history, to regain full control over the 
society. 
The weakness of the Polish communists lies in the fact 
that despite the attempts to present the reforms as their 
own desire for greater democratization they can no longer 
successfully deny that the society was able, for a limited 
time, to seize the political initiative from the party. The 
constitutional reforms, both those already in effect since 
1982 and the ones expected to follow, provide evidence of the 
regime's efforts to regain political ground and institution-
alize the major aspects of its program of "socialist 
renewal". (Appendix 4) At the same time the ideological 
factor has almost completely lost its significance in 
handling yet another phase of the legitimacy crisis in 
Poland. The authorities themselves openly admit that they 
are no•longer overwhelmingly popular in the nation2 • In this 
context a search for a new legal significance of the refor~ed 
basic law becomes a crucial task for the authorities for whom 
the only credible explanation of the party rule remains in 
the geopolitical sphere, thus leaving no alternative to ~ha 
present system. 
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The role of the constitution in Poland becomes greater 
during periods of political and economic turmoil. The party 
attempts to use it as a justification of its continuous rule 
whereas the awakened opposition, frequently focusing on the 
national traditions of sovereign constitutional government 
seeks more legal protection for citizens rights. The latter 
often means trying to interpret the basic law as an indepen-
dent guarantee which is supposed to prevent political 
oppression. The more the text of the constitution becomes 
influenced by the ever-changing political programs of the 
party the less significant the legal meaning of its provi-
sions becomes. This fact, in conjunction with the goal-
oriented function of the document, helps reduce the role of 
the constitution to the mere descriptiou of the state and 
society which puts too much emphasis on the abstract and 
ideal realization of the ideological doctrine. In effect, 
the currently valid norms and regulations assume only a 
temporary character. 
When the party enters a period of crisis and it tries 
to reassess the legal basis of its rule, it often finds a 
solution in expanding or modifying the measures of political 
control. The constitution becomes a focus of intra-party and 
general public discussion, where consultations with the non-
Communist elements become permissible. The constitution has 
been used by the party to play a stabilizing role in the 
overall process of systemic evolution in Poland. The East 
8 
European societies have been characterized as the ones 
undergoing a "continuous legitimation crisis" (Heller, 1982). 
In the Polish case, and most likely in other communist 
countries of the bloc as well, the emphasis on the legal role 
of the Constitution becomes most pronounced when the crisis 
becomes more intense. The insistence on the programmatic and 
also educational functions usually signifies a beginning of a 
period of post-reform stabilization when the Communist party 
regains confidence in its power. 
The ability of a particular East European country to 
choose its own path of socialist development, (different 
from the Soviet example in many details, even if nominally 
identical in fundamental systemic principles and goals), 
since the late 1950s has allowed the Polish regime more 
freedom in seeking indigenous institutional solutions for 
state organization. The symbolic significance of Polish 
national identity and independence has been acknowledged not 
only by many Communists in the first post-war government but 
most importantly by the Soviets themselves who initially 
regarded an open imposition of a communist or "socialist" 
regime as politically unwise (Polonsky & Drukier, 1980:15-
23). Instead, the first post-year regime was formally a 
coalition of many parties and groups which were bound by 
their faithfulness to the ideals of "democracy", Polish 
patriotism and finally a declaration of friendliness toward 
.the USSR. 
9 
since their coming to power in 1944 the Polish com-
munists have tried to utilize national symbolism by incor-
porating certain traditional institutions, like for example 
the sejm, into the new state stru9ture thus claiming the 
continuation of Polish history at a new, higher stage of 
development. Meanwhile however, the party never gave up an 
idea to build their own foundation of traditional legitimacy, 
not unlike the one which, as some scholars claim, does exist 
in the Soviet Union. (Heller, 1982:58). Often during 
periods of intensified political crisis the official 
reha;bilitation of the previously concealed periods of the 
national past and the new more open debate over the con-
troversies, including those hidden from the public to date, 
lead to the acceptance of necessary institutional reforms. 
Previously rejected state organs such as the Supreme Chamber 
of Control, the Tribunal of State, the Constitutional 
Tribunal and, most recently a proposal to reestablish the 
two-chamber parliament3, are recreated within the framework 
of the new system. 
The Polish communists themselves have acknowledged 
their indebtedness to at least some general principles of the 
1921 Constitution, the first basic law of independent Poland 
after 120 years of foreign rule. The presence of both 
democratic and authoritarian tendencies in the Polish modern 
constitutional history provide a revealing illustration of a 
nation whose state organization has always been extremely 
10 
unstable. The major conflict between a desire to build a 
strong independent state in the very vulnerable part of 
Europe on one hand, and the traditional respect for political 
liberties, individual freedoms, and pluralism on the other 
also found its reflection in the country's modern constitu-
tions. The contemporary communist rulers of Poland are 
apparently aware of this legacy. 4 During the last 44 years 
of their rule they have not managed to diminish its sig-
nificance. The calls for Poland's return to the Western 
model of a democratic, pluralist society which become more 
and more pronounced in the atmosphere of continuous political 
and economic failures of the present system, can base their 
legitimacy on the country's independent political past, 
interrupted by Wor~d War II and terminated by the Soviet-
backed communist take-over. 
NOTES 
1 . The Polish communists adopted the term "Po)lska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa" ("People's Poland" from the 
program of the pre- war peasant progressive movements. 
see Cekalski and Litynski, 1987. 
"Rzeczpospolita" is an ancient Polish term descri~ing an 
independ~nt Polish state. It can be translated into 
English either as the "Commonwealth" or the "Republic." 
Another Polish word for Republic - Republika, is also 
used to describe member republics of the Soviet Union. 
In general,it usually refers to the form of government. 
In the Polish constitutional contest it appears that 
the term "Rzeczpospolita" was chosen to indicate the 
sovereign nature of the new Polish state. 
2. See Rakowski, M. "Tetno zycia politycznego bije za 
slabo" in Polityka No 52, 1987. 
J. See Adam Lopatka, "Opinie" in Polityka, No 50 1987. 
4. See Jaruzelski's speeches and interviews in 
11 
Jaruzelski (1985) for the evidence of patriotic rhetoric. 
CHAPTER II 
THE AUTHORITARIAN AND DEMOCRATIC TENDENCIES 
IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 
INDEPENDENT POLAND 1918-1939 
The creation of the Polish state became an interna-
tional issue during World War I largely due to the famous 
Wilson's "fourteen points". The need for ~n independent 
Poland in Europe was finally acknowledged by the Entante at 
the Versailles conference in 1919. Meanwhile, the political 
developments in Poland itself gained their own momentum 
bringing to the fore fierce ideological disputes which had 
been simmering already for many years during the period of 
foreign domination. At this time crucial e~ternal factors 
combined with the internal circumstances, produced a final 
constitutional compromise in the early 1920s. 
Among the outside influences the most important was 
the geographical location of Poland between Russia and 
Germany. The armed conflicts and territorial disputes with 
these major powers and other smaller nations (Czechoslovakia, 
Ukraine, Lithuania) were endemic until 1923. These included 
the Polish-Soviet war of 1920-21 and the prolonged conflict 
with Germany over Silesia. The economic instability of 
Europe also contributed to the precarious position of Poland. 
The internal situation, on the other hand, was compli-
cated by a fragmented party system and difficult ethnic 
12 
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problems. Two major antagonistic political programs which 
had been formulated in the course of a century long struggle 
for independence emerged during that time. One was proposed 
bY the National Democrats, the other by the Socialists -
mainly by the Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partia Socialis-
tyczna-PPS), Aside from this major conflict the o~erall 
political spectrum was by no means clear-cut. Deep factional 
divisions precluded any·united action on the left. In the 
center, a strong peasant political movement emerged and on 
the right the monarchists and other conservative elements 
were still very much alive. The political debate was 
greatly influenced by the old 19th century ideological 
cleavages. 
Popular identification with the new state and a chance 
for mass participation in the political process were severely 
restrained by the profound differences among the three parts 
of Poland which for over 120 years had remained under diverse 
foreign political and cultural influences. The existence of 
large ethnic minorities within the state boundaries created 
an additional challenge for the Polish political leaders. 
Poland could hardly afford to ignore the rights of various 
nationalities on its territory since the country was bound by 
the Versailles treaty provision emphasizing the necessity for 
a peaceful and just solution to the minority problem. At 
that time, in spite of the strong nationalist tendencies, the 
Political reasons such as the need for an alliance with the 
western democracies and the domestic federalist plans, 
precluded any decisive authoritarian solution in this case. 
14 
Before the full implementation of the new Constitution 
the functioning of the state was based on a set of temporary 
rules called "Little Constitution". Since the parliamentary 
representation of the nation had already been elected in 1919 
"most of the time the rules of a parliamentary government 
according to the western models were used in practice" 
(Peretiatkowicz, 1923:3). The Little Const1tution reflected 
a desire for national unity and consensus on part of the 
major participants in the political process. The mobiliza-
tion of the masses by the parties for any specific ideologi-
cal program was not easy to achieve. The main obstacle was 
the low level of political awareness and profound regional 
differences (with each party maintaining its stronghold in a 
specific region). The outside threat to the new state which 
culminated in the course of the Polish-Soviet war served both 
the purpose of consolidation within the political elite and 
mobilized the population for the national cause {Watt, 
1979:Chapter 6; Polansky, 1972:99). 
The temporary Head of State, Marshal Josef Pilsudski 
was given special executive powers by the Little Constitu-
tion. After his victory over the Russians in 1920 his 
personal prestige and authority in the nation greatly 
increased. Nevertheless, since 1919 he had been always 
15 
formally responsible to the parliament (Sejm) for his 
actions (Peretiatkowicz, 1923:9). The need to provide for a 
strong executive powers in time of external danger and 
internal instability seemed to collide with the necessity to 
accommodate numerous political parties. 
The democratic form of government was not immediately 
replaced by an authoritarian system mostly for the following 
reasons: 1) the strong commitment of almost all parties and 
their leaders (with the exception of the communists and the 
monarchists) to the idea of a democratic republic; 2) 
Pilsudski's unwillingness to use his broad appeal in the 
nation in order to seize absolute dictatorial powers; 3) the 
desire on the part of the National Democrats (mainly of the 
party leader Roman Dmowski) to prevent any strong executive 
office for the fear that such position would inevitably go to 
Pilsudski (Polonsky, 1972:100). 
The Period of Sejmocracy and Its Conseguences 
The constitution which was passed by the National 
Assembly on March 17, 1921 indicated a major political 
compromise but it did not end a bitter rivalry between the 
two major visions of Poland's future. Pilsudski, the 
advocate of a non-political army and strong executive powers, 
obviously tried to secure for himself a privileged role in 
Polish politics, but at the same time he remained faithful to 
the idea of fundamental democratic rights for all Polish 
16 
citizens, not only the ethnic Poles. Following his disap-
pointment with the system dominated by the political parties, 
after 1922 he seemed to have abandoned any plans for an 
executive office. His main rival, National Democrat Roman 
omowski saw in the parliamentary democracy a chance to 
introduce his political program. The ideology of the 
National Democratic party, although remained "democratic" in 
its name and official declarations, was committed to the 
struggle for a country dominated by the ethnic Poles with a 
privileged position for the Roman Catholic religion. This 
nationalist ideology acquired substantial following during 
the 1920s (Polonsky, 1972:52-61). The distribution of state 
authority prescribed by the 1921 Constitution reflected a 
strong bias in favor of committed party politicians. 
The basic law of the French Third Republic was chosen 
as a model for the Polish political system (Jedruch, 
1982:343)1. The March 1921 Constitution declared that "the 
sovereign power in the Polish Republic shall be vested in the 
Nation" (art. 2). The main democratic tendency was expressed 
by the powers granted to the Diet (Sejm), which was declared 
"a representative of the Nation." All laws required author-
ization from the Diet. The Sejm controlled the Government. 
The vote of non-confidence could dismiss any single minister 
or the whole cabinet. The deputies were guaranteed broad 
legal protection and immunity from prosecution. They were 
elected to represent the Nation as a whole and could not be 
17 
held responsible to their specific constituencies (art. 20). 
The other chamber of the parliament, the Senate, was granted 
rather limited powers, amounting mostly to an advisory role 
in reviewing the Sejm legislation. A desire to prevent a 
strong executive was reflected by the limited presidential 
powers. 
According to art. 39, the President was to be elected 
by the National Assembly for the period of seven years. The 
chief executive could dissolve the parliament only with the 
consent of the Senate. He was not granted legislative 
initiative nor veto power. The president could only issue 
executive orders regulating the implementation of statutes. 
The presidential power to issue decrees was restricted and 
required a co-signature of an appropriate minister. Thus the 
President was exempt from civil or parliamentary respon-
sibility~· but could be accused before the Tribunal of State 
for constitutional violations. An organ instituted for the 
purpose of auditing the state administration - the Supreme 
Chamber of Control (Najwy~sza Izba Kontroli - NIK) , was 
nominated by the Sejm and exempt from the executive super-
vision. The distribution of state power at the local level 
was, however, much less clearly defined. 
The democratic principles of local self-government 
were adopted in the form of decentralization and aimed at 
political as well as economic autonomy (art. 66, 67, 68) but 
the state also secured for itself strict control over those 
18 
autonomous organs (art, 70). The Constitution failed to 
specify the legal relationship between the state administra-
. n and the local elective bodies, leaving the eventual 
tio 
solution of this problem to the future law regulating 
administrative jurisdiction (the Administrative Tribunal) 
(art. 73). The institution of independent judges, appointed 
by the president was both protected from administrative 
organs and separated from urgent decisions in state matters. 
The judiciary branch was not permitted to exercise 
constitutional authority in challenging the legality of the 
statutes (art. 81). The ultimate judgement about the state 
law belonged to the Sejm, which elected the Tribunal of 
State. The Supreme Court was allowed to judge the validity 
of parliamentary elections when the official results were 
contested. This was an important step forward towards a 
greater role of the courts (Peretiatkowicz, 1923:10). A 
democratic intention of the 1921 Constitution was fully 
expressed by a set of provisions regarding the rights of 
individual citizens. 
The basic law.guaranteed freedoms of speech, associa-
tion, migration, and assembly. Significant protections 
against arrest and seizures were also emphasized (art. 95-
101). A need for state assistance "in case of unemployment 
or accident" was acknowledged (art. 102). These assurances, 
along with a promise of free elementary education for all 
citizens, signalled an attempt to increase the state's 
19 
responsibility for the welfare of individual citizens. All 
those rights and liberties were preceded in the text by six 
articles (art. 89-94) concerning citizens' obligations, 
including military service, parents duty to provide for their 
children's education, and other public burdens which might be 
imposed by the state. The Council of Ministers (Government)2 
could suspend the basic rights of citizens in case of a 
national emergency. For this decision a consent of the 
President was required. Finally, such decrees were always 
subject to the final sanction of the Sejm (art. 124). The 
Diet became not only the major guardian of individual rights, 
but also of the basic law as a whole. 
An amendment to the Constitution could only be passed 
by a majority of 2/3 of the Sejm in the presence of at least 
one half of the total number of deputies (art. 125). Such 
motion could only be initiated by at least 1/4 of the total 
number of deputies and had to be announced 15 days in 
advance. A systematic revision of the Constitution was to be 
made every 25 years by the National Assembly (the Sejm and 
the Senate). The government structure, as described so far, 
resulted in the unquestionable dominance of the Sejm. 
If a principle of elective representation is accepted 
as a pillar of modern democracy, such system could have been 
easily justified in terms of offering the freely chosen 
delegates an institutionalized access to the decision making 
process and thus expressing the will of the nation as a 
20 
whole. In the context of very unstable politics in Poland 
the electoral ordinance to the Sejm proved unable to 
successfully combine the idea of just and proportional 
representation with the competitive multi-party system. 
Lists of candidates were set up in each district by the 
parties. Voting was to proceed according to the "universal, 
direct and equal ballot in conformity with the principle of 
proportional representation" (d'Hondt system) (art. 11}. 
Even the smallest parties were able to secure their 
own representatives in the Diet. The largest ones benefited 
additionally from the so-called "state lists" which included 
"the most respectable citizens" who otherwise might have been 
rejected by the voters (Peretiatkowicz, 1923:9}. The right 
to elect deputies to the Sejm for a 5-year term was guaran-
teed to all men and women, at least 21 years of age (art. 
12}. The active military personnel did not have this 
privilege (Pilsudski's influence, - [T.I.] - see above). 
Elections to the Senate were conducted according to 
similar principles. Only the voting age was raised to 30 
years and the eligibility for a seat was raised to 40 years 
instead of 25 for the lower chamber. Some minor residency 
requirements for the voters were also added (art. 36}. Th2 
military persons in active service could be elected to both 
chambers. 
This short description of the basic principles of the 
"March Constitution" {Konstytucja Marcowa} reveals an 
21 
institutional pattern whose obvious democratic foundations 
~aY obscure a real possibility of change in the authoritarian 
direction. This threat to democracy could have emerged both 
from within the legal system itself as well as from the 
extra-constitutional action. 
The Sejm was granted very broad powers and since none 
of the parties could on their own emerge with a clear 
majority in the chamber, a potential threat by a single 
extremist group appeared remote. Nevertheless, the National 
Democrats, for instance, have demonstrated their unusual 
strength and ability to form coalitions in the aftermath of 
the 1922 elections. A lack of counterbalance from a strong 
executive not only encouraged greater party militancy, but 
first of all caused government UI1stability. This situation, 
in connection with various corrupt practices of the deputies, 
led to the system of rule called "Sejmocracy" (Sejmokracja} 
(Watt, 1979:175-195). 
On the level of local administration another threat to 
the democratic principles of government was evident. A 
contradiction between a desire for close national unity and 
granting extensive self-government to various localities was 
not satisfactorily resolved. Basic freedoms for the 
individuals, including special provisions for ethnic and 
religious minorities, were guaranteed (arts. 109-111). At 
the same time, however, the Roman-Catholic Church was granted 
a special privileged status (art. 114) and the legal 
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situation of other religions was heavily dependent on the 
state regulation (arts. 112-113; 115-116). The duties of the 
citizens to the state seemed to indicate clear priority of 
the national over the individual welfare and security. A 
special position of such obligations in the Constitution 
could be better understood in relation to the specific 
conditions of the Polish state. The necessity to protect the 
newly won independence amid imminent dangers of foreign 
aggression could have been the most significant justification 
behind imposing certain burdens on the population, such as 
the military service. A large number of men under arms, 
however, could also constitute a destabilizing factor for a 
new democracy. 
Marshal Pilsudski especially insisted on the military · 
autonomy with an independent Inspector General of the Army as 
its head. His authority among the officers' corps was 
perhaps, much weaker than in the population as a whole, but 
what counted was that "the Sejm did not dare enact [an] army 
organization project of which he disapproved" (Rothschild, 
1966:37-38). The Constitution made the President Commander-
in-Chief in time of peace. In case of war the chief 
executive was to appoint the Supreme Commander. The 
influence of the Minister of War· (responsible to the Sejm) 
upon this nomination is also evident in the Constitution 
(art. 45-46). In the mid-1920s, an attempt to reorganize the 
military further along these lines was designed to erode 
pilsudski's power base within the army by strengthening the 
parliamentary control (Rothschild, 1966:31). 
on the surface, such move looked like an attempt to 
eliminate an authoritarian threat by subjecting the army to 
democratic control. In reality, however, this move was 
sponsored by the National Democrats in order to undermine 
pilsudski's influence (27-44). The subsequent political 
developments in Poland brought to the fore strong anti-
establishment forces which sought to abolish the existing 
form of the Sejm-dominated democracy. 
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The idea of constitutional change surfaced as a result 
of the coup d'etat in May 1926. Marshal Josef Pilsudski, the 
leader of the takeover, assumed a role of virtually unques-
tioned authority for the new "Sanacja" regime. 3 The Polish 
strongman himself, although actually functioned as a dictator 
until his death in 1935, never was a dedicated enemy of 
democracy (Watt, 1979:265; Kulesza, 1985:50-51). After the 
coup his political supporters were faced with an uneasy task 
of laying foundations for a new government. A need for 
basic changes in the state law was acknowledged not only 
among Pilsudski's followers, but also by some opposition 
parties that did not benefit from the previous parliamentary 
rule. On the left there was a hope for more radical reforms. 
Some parties on the right saw the coup as a preferable 
alternative to communism or other revolutionary solution 
(Polonsky, 1972:173-77). These opinions notwithstanding, the 
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change which actually did occur led to the abandonment of the 
"March Constitution" in favor of a specific Polish version of 
authoritarianism. 
The tendencies for reform originated from at least 
three different sources. Pilsudski himself provided an 
ideological inspiration, but he never really expressed a 
coherent and comprehensive political program for his 
supporters. His initial willingness for accommodation with 
the Sejm inspired a conciliatory position, manifested by the 
prime-minister Kazimierz Bartel {Kulesza, 1985:72-77). On 
August 2, 1926, significant constitutional amendments were 
passed, giving the President additional powers to issue 
decrees while the Sejm was not in session, allowing hi~ to 
dissolve the parliament without previous restrictions, and 
strengthening the political control exercised by the 
Government {Kulesza, 1985:74; Polonsky, 1972:182-83). The 
question of the military was settled in a compromise by 
governmental decrees, challenging the presidential authority 
over the army and nominating Pilsudski both the head of the 
Inner War Council and the Minister of War. The Marshal thus 
managed to keep this institution away from political conflict 
although the individual army officers actively parti~ipated 
in the government affairs during the years following the coup 
(Polansky, 1972:195-97). At the same time, some more aggres-
sive positions emerged within the "Sanacja". 
In the beginning, the Sejm's role in revising the 
constitution, which meant also collaboration with the 
opposition, was acknowledged by Pilsudski's supporters. 
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Later on, however, more elitist and authoritarian tendencies 
became prominent. A conservative faction placed emphasis on 
the individual freedoms and a selective access to the 
political process (Kulesza, 1985:108-114). Another view, 
expressed by the "colonels' group", advocated an authoritar-
ian model based on the supreme interest of the state, 
superior to individual rights and privileges (Kulesza,Chaptzr 
V) • 
This latter group gained considerable influence within 
the pro-"Sanacja" organization -- The Non-Party Bloc for 
Cooperation with Government {Bezpartyjny Blok Wspolpracy z 
Rzadem - BBWR). The parliamentary elections of 1930, 
conducted in the atmosphere of a strong anti-opposition 
campaign by the government, brought a definite victory for 
the Bloc. The final proposal for a new "constitutional 
legislation", sponsored by the BBWR, was passed despite 
obvious violation of the law in 1934. 4 Because of Pil-
sudski 's insistence for a proper parliamentary procedure the 
final vote on this matter was delayed until April 1935. 
The Constitutional Basis of the "Sanacja" Regime 
The distribution of authority in the new constitution was 
strikingly different from the previous law. The former rule 
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regarding the separation of the three main branches of 
government: the executive, the legislature, and the 
judiciary was officially abandoned (Wereszczynski, 1936:36). 
The President was to occupy the most influential position. 
The other branches of government, totally subordinated to 
him, were defined as follows: The Council of Ministers (the 
Government), the Sejm, the Senate, the Armed Forces and the 
supreme Chamber of Control (art. 3). A candidate for 
president was to be chosen either by the Electoral Assembly 
or the incumbent president himself (art. 16). The Assembly 
was selected only partially by the Sejm (50 members) and the 
Senate (25 members). The highest government officials such 
as the marshals of the Sejm and the Senate, the Prime-
Minister, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the 
General Inspector of the Armed Forces automatically beca~e 
members of that body (art. 17). When the incumbent president 
nominated a candidate different from the one chosen by the 
Assembly a popular election had to be called. 
Presidential decrees were made equal in legal status 
to the Sejm legislation. The veto power was granted to the 
chief executive and he was entitled to dissolve the Sejm and 
the Senate at any time (art. 13). The Government was made 
responsible to the President and his approval was needed for 
the parliamentary motion of no-confidence. In response to 
the Sejm's vote of non-confidence the President could either 
dismiss the cabinet or dissolve the Sejm (art. 29). 
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The President was also guaranteed an indirect role in 
the legislative initiative through influencing particular 
ministers selected by him {art 25, par. 5). Thus the 
Government, backed by the presidential authority, assumed a 
verY advantageous position in confrontation with the Sejm. 
The constitutional responsibility of the President was 
eliminated by granting him special prerogatives which 
regulated "important matters of the state" and were exempt 
from the requirement of a ministerial co-signature (art. 
13). Among them were such rights as the nomination of the 
Prime-Minister, the Chief Justice, the Chief of the Supreme 
Chamber of Control, the General Inspector of the Armed 
Forces, the Supreme Commander in time of war, the judges for 
the Tribunal of State, the 1/3 of the Senate members, and the 
executive pardon. Finally, the President was obliged to 
protect the general well-being of the state and its security. 
However, his responsibility for these and other duties was 
severely limited {art. 15), as one Polish contemporary writer 
put it: "this [President's responsibility] was left to the 
judgement of 'God and History'" (Wereszczynski, 1935:76). 
The democratic nature of the political system was not 
so much undermined by the strengthening of the presidential 
office, as by a lack of proper balance between the executive 
and the legislature. The Sejm not only lost its dominant 
role as the law-making body, but also its exclusive domain 
was reduced mostly to the control over the budget, and even 
The here a specific time limit was set {arts. 58-60). 
constitution explicitly stated that "the functions of 
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governing the state do not belong to the Sejm" (art. 21 par. 
3) • The constitutional change also affected the immunity of 
the dep.uties. 
The members of the Sejm who committed offenses 
against the state could be accused before the Tribunal of 
state, the institution now controlled by the President (art. 
41). The Sejm retained its power as an important legislator 
in most state matters, ·but the Senate review powers were 
broadened. 
The majority of 3/5, instead of the former 11/20, of 
the Sejm deputies was needed to defeat Senate amendments of 
legislative acts. The marshal of the Senate was also IT.ade a 
chairman of the joint sessions of both chambers, and his 
political position became more powerful than that of the 
Sejm. He retained most of his powers even at the time Senate 
was not in session or after its dissolution. In case of 
presidential incapacity the marshal of the Senate was 
entitled to exercise chief executive powers (art. 
The changes leading towards limiting the role of the 
Sejm coincided with a move against party doninance i~ the 
political process. The main indication of this tendency was 
the new electoral ordinance of July 8, 1935.5 
The new law provided for special district assemblies 
Which selected candidptes for deputies. The delegates for 
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these assemblies were to be chosen by the local self-
government councils, business associations, trade unions, 
professional organizations, academic institutions, and other 
similar groups. Also delegates of the population as a whole 
could be designated in proportion of one for every 500 
voters. The "state lists" of candidates were abolished. The 
proportionality clause was also abolished, making it more 
important to vote for a particular name than a party label 
(Wereszczynski, 1936:105-106). The other four basic 
electoral principles, that is: univsersal, secret, equal and 
direct voting were confirmed (art. 32, par. 1). The 
electoral procedure however, was designed in such a way that 
the first two candidates on the list had a clear advantage 
ovsr the others (Wereszczynski, 1936: 113). Given the 
increased government influence in the electoral process, it 
was possible for the authorities to control the outcome 
through an appropriate ordering of the names on the ballot. 
Finally, a substantial number of voters was eliminated by 
raising the age limit to 24 years. Even more significant 
changes took place in the case of senatorial elections. 
Only three elite categories of persons, chosen on the 
basis of their parsonal merit, education, and citizens' trust 
{that is members of local self-government or professional and 
educational organizations) could vote for the Senators, 
Provided that such people were at least 30 years old. These 
citizens voted indirectly by choosing delegates to the 
electoral colleges. Only 2/3 of the Senate was subject to 
election. The remaining members were nominated by the 
president. Only persons 40 years of age or more were 
eligible. 
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The Courts turned out to be the least affected by the 
new law, at least in their independence from the executive. 
The President retained his function to nominate the judges. 
The courts were independent from the state administration and 
a special tribunal was set up resolve conflicts between the 
government agencies and the judicial system (art. 70, par. 
le). A separate Supreme Administrative Tribunal was created 
to judge the legality of administrative acts - a continua-
tion of the previous constitutional intention from 1921 (art. 
70, par. 16). The cou?ts were not allowed to question the 
validity of the legislation (art. 64, par. 5). According to 
the 1928 decree regulating the court system, a special 
government prerogative in case of internal disturbances or 
war allowed for the creation of special courts, exempt fro~ 
an established legal procedure (Wereszczynski, 1935:280-281). 
The first chapter of the 1935 Constitution established the 
basis for relationship between the citizens and the state 
expanding the authority of the latter over the individual 
rights {arts. 4-9). 
Some important rights were retained in the previous 
form (art. 99, 109-118 and art. 120 of the old constitution), 
but at the same time the new law placed citizen's obligation 
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to the state more explicitly before his freedoms. 6 While 
the individual rights were subordinated to an idea of 
"general well-being", the prote6tion of private property and 
the special status of the Church were left intact. In the 
official propaganda of that time the "solidarity theory" was 
referred to by some writers as a proper foundation of the 
relationship between the citizens and the state. This idea 
was explained as a most suitable alternative to totalitarian 
regimes (Panstwa Totalne) and liberal democracies {Panstwa 
Liberalne). Philosophical and legal foundations of the new 
system were traced back to the syndycalist theory of George 
Sorel and the solidarity theory introduced by a French le~al 
scholar Leon Duguit (Wereszczynski; 1935:302). The author~t­
arian ideas formulated in such way were intended not only for 
the central government. 
On the local level, a great emphasis was put on the 
close cooperation between the elective bodies and the state 
administration. However, after abolishing the old law the 
Constitution did not specify any new rules for the local 
government. Only in the late 1930s the new statutes added 
some special powers to the local Government executive 
officials (206). The final introduction of the basic la~ q~s 
a result of a long process of ideological, political, atld 
legal preparation. The Constitution was designed to last. 
It was extremely difficult for the Sejm to pass 
constitutional amendments. Such proposals had to be 
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initiated by at least 1/4 of the total number of deputies. 
TheY became law only if passed by a legal majority (a half of 
the total number of members plus one) of both houses of the 
parliament. The President was allowed to veto such bill. 
case this was overridden he could dissolve the Sejm and the 
senate. The chief executive himself had the right to propose 
constitutional amendments. The vote on his proposals was to 
be based on the usual majority (at least 1/2 of the members 
present) of both houses. A presidential project could only 
be rejected or accepted as a whole (art. 80). The authori-
tarian tendenci.es, expressed most clearly by granting the 
President and the Government such extraordinary powers, were 
so obvious in the 1935 Constitution that a strong reaction 
from the political opposition was hardly a ~urprise. 
The electoral boycott in 1935 and 1938 was the most 
visible evidence of the anti-authoritarian sentiments. 
Nevertheless, the major political parties were not ba~ned 
(except for the communists and groups labelled as ''subver-
sive") and could in fact sponsor, if not openly endorse, 
particular candidates for elective offices. Despite 
increasingly hostile policies of the "Sanacja" regime in 
1930s, the partiej did not lose all their strength and 
vitality on the political scene. It appeared that the 
electoral boycott, while denying legitimacy to the regime, 
removed the parties from significant influence in the 
government. However, largely due to the deep-rooted 
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traditions, the party influence was clearly demonstrated 
during the 1938 local and municipal elections (Jedruch, 1982: 
363_64). Yet another consequence of the constitutional 
intention was a number of decrees further limiting the scope 
of individual rights. 
The strong rofe of the Government has been reinforced 
bY such regulations as the 1932 laws concerning the associa-
tions and assembly procedures (Wereszczynski, 1936: 306-07). 
The "Sanacja" domestic policy, although increasingly repres-
sive towards the opposition after 1930, was, however, never 
implemented in a systematic and ruthless manner reminiscent 
of the modern totalitarian regimes. 
According to a Polish conservative historian, the 1935 
Constitution was influenced by three important factors: "1) 
the political system of the United States; 2) the attitude 
toward Pilsudski as a presidential candidate [andJ 3) ~0dern 
ideas of authoritarian constitutional thought" {Cat-
Mackiewicz, 1940: 231-32). The Constitution was also 
interpreted as an attempt to preserve Pilsudski's ideas 
(Jedruch, 1982: 360-61). The Sejm, despite its subordi~ate 
role, remained an important institution. After the death of 
the "Marshal" the regime was unable to maintain the non-party 
form of support either in the parliament or in the society as 
a whole. The BBWR was finally dissolved at the end of 1935. 
Obviously totalitarian schemes, initiated by the 
" 1 co onels • group" (mostly the members of the Camp of rration.=.l 
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tJnity--OZOM, created in 1936) and their supporters on the 
political right, failed miserably due to the strong opposi-
tion inside the Government (Polonsky, 1972:430-434). An 
example of dangerous trends toward a military dictatorship 
was evident in an unusual presidential instruction issued in 
June, 1936. It gave the Supreme Commander of the Armed 
Forces a right to special honors which had been reserved so 
far for the president himself (Cat-Mackiewicz, 1940; 289-93). 
However, by 1938 the government became less tolerant of such 
obvious constitutional violations and more favorable in 
relations with the opposition (Polonsky, 1972:435). 
Many democratic practices were weakened but not 
abandoned after 1935, ~ainly for the following reasons: 1 \ ..i. I 
the political program of the "Sanacja" failed to gain popular 
support; 2) the concept of the state, not a mass political 
movement constituted a basis for the system (Kulesza, 1935: 
276-285); 3) Pilsudski's influence was characterized by 
hostility towards the models of Italian fascis~ and German 
Nazism, and his "old-fashioned" belief in the parliamentary 
system (285), although not in unrestricted party pluralis~. 
All these factors greatly contributed to the specifi~ 
character of the Polish authoritarianism introduced by 
1935 Constitution. 
Andrew c. Janos, in his analysis of East European 
Political history calls the democratic elements in the pre-
1939 authoritarian regimes in this area "pluralism by 
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default, not by design" (Huntington & Moore et al, 1968: 
233 ). The specific external influences notwithstanding, as 
long as the "Sanacja"· regime accepted Pilsudski's ideas and 
their constitutional reflection they could not completely 
reject democracy. The Constitution never became only a tool 
of a dictatorial regime, largely due to the role of the 
traditional elites in the Polish society. 7 Hence, modern 
totalitarian tendencies did not have a real chance to develop 
in independent Poland. The democratic forces among those 
elites were not definitely cut-off from influence and could 
still rely on local power bases. The "Sanacja" was first 
unwilling and then unable to organize its own cohesive and 
strongly ideological party. Together with the lack of mass 
support among the population, this factor contributed to 
actual weakness of the Polish authoritarian regime envisioned 
by the 1935 Constitution. 
1. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
36 
MOTES 
Refer to Jedruch (1982) for a detailed discussion of the 
democratic tendencies in the Polish constitutions and 
legislation since 1493. 
As Jedruch (1982) points out, and important distinction 
exists between the Polish language words "rzad'', and 
"rz•dzic" meaning "government" and "to govern". In many 
cases European usage of the word· "rzad" refers to the 
executive function only, in contrast to the American 
understanding of "government" which describes the 
legislative and judiciary branches as well. In this 
chapter the word "Government" is used in the sense of 
Polish "Rz~d" and "government" (small 'g') retains its 
broader meaning. 
As Polonsky (1972) explains, the term "Sanacja" could 
be translated as "something between 'purification' and 
'reform', and was chosen in order to indicate the Govern-
ment's desire to clear away the negative features of 
pre-1926 political system (p. 183). 
Article 125 of the 1921 Constitution required a 15-day 
notice on such move, which was not given at the ti~e. 
See: Constitution of the Rep~b+ic of Pol~nd {1935): 
for the Outline of Legislation on Elections, pp. 39-47. 
Article 7 in paragraph 1 declares that: "The rights cf 
a citizen to influence public affairs wi~l be estimated 
according to the value of his efforts and services for 
the common good." 
For the discussion of the "elite" concept in the 1935 
Constitution see the analysis of Kulesza {1985} pp. 
173-177. 
CHAPTER III 
THE POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBL!C 
Both the March 1921 and the April 1935 constitutions 
reflected certain democratic and authoritarian ideas which 
had developed within the Western world. The 19th century 
concepts of liberal and democratic state clashed with modern 
elitist and autocratic philosophies. The post-World War II 
political situation led to the creation of a quite differe~t 
type of state.in Poland, called the "People's Republic". 
After 1944, the constitutional debate occurred as an 
underlying phenomenon in the struggle of various political 
groups for legitimacy. From the collapse of Poland in 1939 
until the introduction of the new constitution in 195~, th=ee 
different documents were considered, at various time 
intervals, the basic law of the country: 1) the April 1935 
Constitution; 2) some principles and provisions of the ~a=ch 
1921 Constitution {exactly what these were is still debata-
ble); and 3) the "Little Constitution'' of 1947. 
During the early years after the war t~e Soviet-b~ctee 
provisional government functioned on the basis of major 
decrees and proclamations aimed at creating the necessary 
foundation for a new political system. In the Marxist 
literature this type of activity which regulated many aspects 
Of constitutional law outside of a constitution has been 
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labeled "constitutional practice" {Jarosz & Zawadzki, 
1987:98-99). In Poland this phenomenon emerged as a useful 
iegal and political device for the communists in their 
struggle for power. 
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Until 1945 Poland had officially only one government, 
residing ~n London, and exercising its authority over the 
•underground state" in the occupied country through its 
delegate. The London government recognized the April 1935 
constitution as remaining in force until the formation of 
independent Poland after the war. This attempt to secure 
legal continuity of the Polish state was opposed by the 
Soviet-sponsored government residing in Lublin, Poland, and 
formally organized on December 31, 1944. 
The first document indicating changes in a future 
constitution was the proclamation of the Polish Committee 
National Liberation {Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego-
PF.'.W?T), announced already in July, 1944. This document 
avoided any direct reference to a total revolutionary 
transfor~ation of the society and politics along the 
communist lines. However, a significant program of la~d 
reform and nationalization of the basic industries ~era 
initiated. ~his constituted the first significant chall~~ge 
to the for~er constitutional protection of the private 
ownership in the economic sphere. 1 The PKWN also called f::ir 
a wide "national front" which would include all "democratic 
forces". The 1921 Constitution with its "parliamentary-
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demo~ratic principles" was to be terr.porarily accepted as the 
basic framework for government operations. 
The communist Polish Workers Party (PPR) was the 
strumental force in the policy-making process of that 
period. The representative body of the new government--t~e 
National Council (Krajowa Rada Narodowa-KRN) , which func-
tioned as a substitute for a parliament, never actually 
accepted the whole March Constitution as a foundation of the 
new state. The communist politicians who controlled that 
body could therefore selectively apply in practice some of 
the constitutional provisions, while omitting the other. 
In the summer of 1945 the Western Allies switched 
their official recognition from the London based govern~ent, 
led by a socialist Tomasz Arciszewski, to the Lublin authori-
ties. This was a turning point in the struggle for t~e 
future political system in Poland. Under an 3greement 
negotiated with the Western Allies at Yalta, Soviet leader 
Stalin agreed to a formula for the new Polish gover~me~t 
which would include some "democratic elements" f:::-om the 
London government. Former prime-minister of the gove~n~ent 
in-exile Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, who opposed Arcis=awski's 
policies, decided to return to Poland with a group of 
followers and joined the provisional government in the su~~er 
of 1945. This political group, which existed in opposition 
to the conmunists until 1948, attempted several ti~es tc make 
the 1921 Constitution a real foundation of the futu~e P~l£sh 
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state (Rybicki et al 1977: 304-05}. However, by the ti=.e 
these forces joined the new government, the comrnunists had 
already managed to acquire considerable advantage due to the 
powerful domestic and international factors. 2 
The official communist interpretation of the post-
World War II situation provided a guideline for the exercise 
of the "constitutional practice". The rejection of the 
"bourgeois" theory of law led to the condemnation of any 
democratic form of government, which originated from a 
"capitalis~-dominated society". The new law, "deter~ined 
the historical necessity," was supposed to represent the 
working masses. 3 The democratic facade, reminiscent of the 
previous systems was preserved for the most part. This was 
the case mainly because of the following: 1) the Soviets 
insisted on such arrangement, both as a proof of "good 
intentions" for the Western Allies, and as a useful method to 
deceive any political opposition in Poland; 2} the popula-
tion in the country was very hostile to any obvious radic~l 
changes toward the Soviet model (Polansky & Drukier, 1?80:5~-
90; 3} the conservative and liberal-democratic traditio~s 
were very strong among the prominent elites and the corn-
munists had to acknowledge this in their atternpts to ct3n;3 
the political system (Rybicki et al, 1977: 305-07); L1 ' - I
faction which emerged from the internal struggle within the 
PPR advocated a moderate course and condemned the "sect~rian 
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elements" pushing for more radical solutions (Polonsky & 
orukier' '1980: 114) . 
The early PKWM initiative to introduce a democratic 
form of government was based on the Soviet model of the local 
community councils responsible to the National Council (KRU). 
The presence of the strong authoritative tendencies was, 
however, from the very beginning hidden behind the apparently 
democratic structure. When the opposition elements began to 
gain ground within the councils this institution was 
abandoned in favor of the old, centralized administrati7e 
model, based on the pre-war system (Polonsky & Drukier, 
1980:34). As their power became more consolidated the 
communists returned to the idea of those Soviet-style 
councils. This time the powers of such assemblie~ were 
severely restricted by the PPR (78}. The constitutional 
practi~~ of this period resembles closely ruling methods 
typical authoritarian government which is said to possess "~~ 
inherent tendency to proliferate legal norms" (Friedrich & 
BrzezinsJ.:i, 1965: 120). 
While ad~itting the political opposition to the 
government, in practice, the key ministries (industry and 
trade, and public security) were controlled by the PPR. 
the army was strictly under the communist (and Soviet) 
control (Polonsky & Dukier, 1980:126}. The pluralist par~y 
system was nominally reestablished, but the opponents of the 
"national front" were officially labeled as ''reactionaries" 
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or "fascists". The so-called "friendly parties,'' on the 
other hand, were either encouraged or coerced into close 
cooperation with the PPR--thus surrendering their indepen-
dence (Mikolajczyk, 1948; C~kalski & Lityhski, 1987:16). 
In 1946 the communists officially revealed their 
intentions to introduce particular constitutional reforms. A 
law was passed declaring a national referendum. A popular 
vote was called on three issues: 1) the elimination of the 
Senate; 2) the introduction of land reform and natior.ali=a-
tion of the basic industries with a preservation of some 
elementary private ownership rights; 3) the confirmation of 
the new western borders of Poland. The communists calle1 fer 
a positive vote on all these questions and the official 
results showed the majority supporting this position. 
The idea of a national referendum appeared in the 
communist constitutional practice for political reasons in 
order to help legitimize the regime and gain advantage o~er 
the opposition. Later the referendum law was not included in 
the actual charter of 1952. It appeared that in the 1950s 
the established communist regime was not eager to provid2 
additional opportunities for the expression of public 
opinion. Aside from this, a seemingly democratic nature of 
this particular referendum was obscured by some significant 
factors: 1) the questions did not address any real 
controversial issue among the population and the voting 
actually was reduced to the role of legitimizing 
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co~munist policies; 2) the decision of the opposition 
forces to support the Senate in order to demonstrate their 
strength brought about a widespread campaign of repression 
and election fraud, inspired by the PPR (Mikolajczyk, 1948: 
chapter 13); 3) the law did not specify whether the results 
of the referendum were to be legally binding or had only a 
consultative role (Jarosz & Zawadzki, 1987:43). 
The communist takeover culminated in the 1947 
parliamentary elections. Despite protests from the opposi-
tion and proofs of electoral fraud the PPR-led bloc of 
parties won the majority of seats. Even if the independer.t 
deputies from the Mikolajczyk's Peasant Party (Polskie 
Stronnictwo Ludowe--PSL) could still utter their opinions in 
the newly elected Sejm their attempts to return to the for~ 
of the 1921 Constitution were futile in practice. The 
communist~-sponsored coalition claimed that "t~e ~echanic~~ 
reproducing of the March Constitution would be contrary to 
our reality, it is a closed chapter of our constitutional 
law" (Rybicki et al., 1977:57). 
There were several important reasons why during 1947-
50 a definite turn in the direction cf the authoritarian (or 
rather totalitarian) rule became evident. First of al~ the 
Soviet influence in Polish affairs increased greatly after 
1947 (Bromke, 1967:62-65). The real opposition, outside 0! 
the "national front ceased to exist in 1948. Also in 1947 
the so-called "Little Constitution" was adopted, which did 
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not contain any clear legal constraints on the authoritari~n 
government practice. 
The process of "Stalinization" in Poland began 
actually in 1948 after the PPR staged a "unification" with 
its close ally, the new Polish Socialist Party (PPS) 4 , 
forming one Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP--PZPR). 
During the same year the nationalist faction within the 
party, headed by Wladyslaw Gomulka, was purged, leaving th2 
way for a small group of Stalinist politicians who practiced 
authoritarian methods of decision-making under close 
supervision from Moscow. For the communist leaders the 
Little Constitution appeared to be a suitable temporary 
substitute for the basic law. 
While re~eating the historical experience ~f 1919-~2 
and formally accepting the basic foundations cf the March 
1921 Constitution, the Little Constitution of 1947 was 
extremely vague in its formulation and lacked proper 
constitutional legitjnacy. Individual rights, for e~a~ple, 
were not mentioned at all. This caused some of the commu~ist 
legal scholars to suggest that the Sejn was at the tin~ t~e 
sole protector of such rights (Rybicki et al., 1977:5~). 
Little Constitution also failed to specify the rel~ and 
structure of the judiciary and thus irt practice during the 
period of early 1950s there existed special ~o~~issio~s ~~~ 
tribunals which imposed severe penalties on the citizens on 
the basis of temporary legislation and in violation of a 
normal independent legal procedure (Jarosz & Zawadzki, 
1987:60). In the atmosphere of an increasingly ideological 
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debate the very need for a new constitution was questioned by 
some Marxist scholars. A solidarity theory of Leon Duguit, 
which had influenced the 1935 Constitution resurfaced once 
again, but this time in the context of a classless society 
(Rybicki et al., 1977:302-03}. 
What f1nally led to the adoption of the new constitu-
tion in 1952 was not a result of a prolonged debate over the 
new law, but a desire to bring about a final legitimation of 
the Stalinist· idea of the "people's democracy". To a lesser 
degree a traditionally strong symbolic value that the 
constitutional documents had retained throughout the Polish 
history also played a role here (Rybicki et al., 1977:!.95-
296). In their study of the first Sejm the official Mar~is~ 
scholars failed to determine the exact reasons why th8 
adoption of the constitution was delayed several ti=es. 
official reason given, a need for popular consultations, 
not appear satisfactory even to the Marxist researchers 
themselves (Rybicki et al.:319-321). It is very likely 
both the authoritarian rulers of Poland at the ti~e and 
Soviet backers were not eager to co~=it the=sel7~s pr~~~-
turely to any more precise legal fra!".lework which wo11ld 
regulate social and governmental activity. 
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Ideological foundations cf the People's Republic of Poland. 
The process of political and socio-economic transfer-
mation initiated by the communists in Poland after World War 
II is commonly described in the official Marxist literature 
as a "revolution" leading to the seizure of power by the 
working people (Jarosz & Zawadzki, 1987:27-36). The new 
state and its constitution were established as a result of ~ 
political takeover by the Communist party and the power 
aspect of its rule cannot be understood without the ideologi-
cal context. Ideology often stands in a way of ratic~al 
action and obscures the perception of socioeco~omic realit7 
which in turn is supposed to justify the revolu-tionary 
transformation of society, a process determined by historic3~ 
necessity. 
The role of the state itself, its structure, 2nd c~n-
sequently a need for a constitution, was a ccnsider3bly 
neglected aspect of Karl Marx•s political thought. Whereas 
he, and later his collaborator Friedrich Engels stressed th~ 
class ch~racter of the "bourgeois state" as an exploit3tive 
force, they never produced any general "theorv of the state" 
(Jessop, 1978:40). [emphasis added T.I.] What re~ains ~ 
special interest of the Mar~ist scholars until to~~7 ~s th2 
"capitalist" society to a "communist" one. 
Marx's prediction that the bourgeois st3te will si~ply 
" . . wither away" did little to solve this dile~~a. !~ c~~ss-
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quence, it was Lenin and later Stalin who, due to their posi-
tion of authority in the communist movement, conceived of 
ideological doctrines explaining the role the state was to 
plaY in the process of revolutionary change. Lenin's 
argument contained in his work State and Revolution became 
a major ideological ~oundation of the modern Soviet and East 
European states. The Russian revolutionary leader singled 
out Marxian description of the Civil War in France and 
presented the short-lived phenomenon of the Paris Commune, 
{1871) as a model of a transitory state with "the proletariat 
organized as the ruling class" {Lenin, 1983:21-22). While 
recommending "smashing of the old [bourgeois] state machi~~ry 
{96}, Lenin, at the same time, opposed anarchy and s~oke ~~ 
favor of the strong party organization, able to lead the 
"dictatorship of the proletariat" {55-59). While rejecti~:; 
bourgeois parliamentary democracy, Lenin acknowled~ed that 
"the transition from capitalism to communism [emph~sis 
will certainly bring a great variety and abundance of 
politic al forms ... ". He added, however, that "the esse::::-.? 
will inevitably be only one: the dictatorshi~ of the 
:>roleta=iat" 
the core of ideological justification which can be us;d at 
present by the conmunist parties i~ the Soviet bloc to 
explain the diversity of their various paths of socialist 
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Lenin's interpretation of Marxis~ stresses the 
importance of national unity--"to be organized by the 
communal constitution" (Lenin, 1983:45). This a need 
f a C ontral government autho~ 4 tv du~in~ th ... P ~8VOlUtionar7 or "" ·· - """ .. ~ - -- ':;i - - -
transformation of society. Stalin further developed this 
idea in his totalitarian, modern version of the Russian state 
and later in his policies of i~posing similar political 
systems in Eastern Europe. Important political consi1era-
tions, however, were the reason why so~e deviations fro~ the 
Leninist pattern occurred. 
Due to the relative weakness of the 'communist parties 
in Eastern Europe after World War II, the new regim~s 
installed by Stalin, with a notable exception of Yugosla~ia, 
initially were kept in power only thanks to the presence of 
the Red Army. The Soviet leader, aware of the difficult 
domestic conditions the local communists had to work in an~ 
the internal and external threats to their rule, had tc 
devise such methods of consolidating their power which c~uld 
bring i~mediate results. This had to be done even at the 
cost of a temporary ideological compromise with the hcstil2 
"bour;eois elements". ~hese considerations, in addition to 
the fear of Western reaction, contributed to the establish-
ment of a new form of state called "People's De~ocracy" ~n~ 
based on a wide national front of political parties with the 
co~munists still in the minority, but allied with .f=,,...;0~~"1-.:• 
..&.. - - ·- •- '-4 - ~ I 
"progressive" peasants and "democratic" bourgeois ele~~nts. 
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Brzezinski's analysis of East European People's 
oemocracies distinguishes two initial stages of their 
development. First of them, lasting approximately until 
1948 was characterized by some institutional remnants of the 
"old regime" in each country. What followed, was a period of 
• II St l' . t. " . h d . ~ +-h s . +-intensive a iniza ion I meaning t e a option 0- w-e OV19-
model of socialism. The 1936 Stalinist Constitution beca~e 
an example of state organization of an advanced socialist 
society (Brzezinski, 1967:25-104). 
Poland, like other Soviet bloc countries, adhered t= 
the same pattern of development. The 1952 Polish Cc~stitu-
tion was a "product of more ripened Stalinisn" (Brzezinski, 
1967:78). Thus its content is actually remi-niscent more ~! 
the Soviet 1936 Con~titution than some funda~ental princip~8s 
of the March 1921 Constitution of Poland which were i~iti~lly 
acce:pt by the new, communist dominated regime. In the 
original text of the basic law the country was ~3~er cailed ~ 
. 
"socialist re~ublic". Nevertheless, by 1952, in resul~ c! 
the id9ological shift within the Soviet bloc, the Polish 
state like other People's De~ocracies in Eastern Europe had 
been already ?~ficially recognized as a "dictatorship c! t~e 
p:::-ol-:t at" (Srzezinski, 196":'14-76). (.A:;>pendi::: !) 
adherence to the Soviet pattern, even if subsequently 
in actual constitutional practice, legal a~endreents, and 
ideological procla~~tions, has re~ained a severe handicap 
50 
the Polish regime in its confrontation with the realit7 of 
social development and the indigenous national traditions. 
Major Provisions of the 1952 Constitution 
In the 1952 Constitution the principle regarding the 
"sovereignty of the Nation" was meant to reflect the new 
socio-political relations in the country {Rybicki, et ~l, 
1977:80). Art. 2' declared that Poland was a republic of the 
urban and rural working people. The role of the Co~munist 
party {PUWP) was not explicitly stated in the basic l:!.W. 
Hence, in reality the ~olitical power was exercised fro~ 
outside of the constitution according to the ideological 
argument that the party is the sole representative of the 
working class. The general intention to att ~ future 
"higher" goals of a "soci~list society", based on the So7iet 
model, was however, clearly stated in the prea~ble. Ons of 
the articles plainly expressed a basic tenet of social'st 
socio-economic relations: "fro~ each according 
ability, to each according to his work" (a~t. 14). Be~i1es 
the obvious influence of the Soviet 1936 Constitution sc~e 
i~portant provisions were si~ilar to the Polish March 1?~1 
l :J. r:r I 1 for exa~pl3 the powers of the Sej~. 
The Sejm became the highest organ of stat 0 power 
15) with exclusive law-making rights. The Sejm elected the 
Council of State, the prime-minister and other Gcvar~~ent 
members. However, the legislative initiative gr3~ted th~ 
deputies was not specified. The me~bers shared this righ+: 
with the Council of State and the Government (art. 20). A 
signature of the Council of State was needed to introduce a 
new legislation, but this did not amount to an executive 
\f'eto. 
5:!. 
According to the Stalinist model, the Council of St~te 
replaced the office of the President which existed until 
1952. The ~ouncil was subordinated to the Sejm, but could 
issue binding decrees when the Diet was not in session (art. 
23) . It was also given the power to "convene the sessio~s ~-
the Sejm and lay down binding interpretation of the law" 
{art. 25, par. 3 & 7). A very important addition to its 
influence was the power to ratify international treaties 
{art. 2 5, par. 7) . 
The abolition of the traditional division into th~ 
three separate branches of government which had already taken 
place after 1935 this time was carried to the other extr~me. 
The Sejm deputies were not banned from membersh~p ~n th~ 
Council of State. Also, they could become ~inisters and were 
able to hold professional and state administration jobs 
during their ter:t in office. In an origi!lal :io•le, N'ith 
equivale~t in the Polish constitutional history, the d:~uties 
were ~ade legally responsible for regular reporting to the 
electorate and were subject to recall (art. 87). 
A mixture of continuity and change in the previous 
de~ocratic traditions was reflected in the chapter describin~ 
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.;,..ldicic.l sys ten. 
"" 
The institution of the Supre~e Court 
was reestablished (art. 46) and the judges were guaranteed 
independence. However, in addition to the judges, the 
constitution provided for the special institution of public 
assessors "to take part in the hearing of cases and the 
pronouncing of sentences" (art. 49). Both the judges and the 
assessors were to be elected, but the Constitution did not 
specify how and by whom (art. 50). An office of the 
prosecutor General was separately established. The law (art. 
53, par. 2) specified that "the Prosecutor General super-
vises, in particular, the prosecution of offenses endangerin; 
the political and sqcial system, security and independence ~f 
the Polish People's Republic". A candidate for this office 
was to be nominated and recalled by the Council of State. 
The new interpretation of the law pronounced the 
"unity of govern:!".lent authority iri the people's der:-.ocraC:'.t" 
(Rybicki et al., 1977:93-99). Therefore, any conflict a~0ng 
the legislative, the executive, and the judicial institutions 
of the st3te was ruled out in principle. Mar~ist constitu-
tional law states that the organs of class-based representa-
tion of the people are superior to any other functional 
organs. They ~rovide direction for the whole activity ~f the 
state. W~ile the Montesquiean idea of segregation of power 
is rejected, the division of competence a~ong state authcrit7 
and state ad~inistration is acknowledged (Jarosz & Zawadzki, 
1987: 157-58). 
• 
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At the same time the language of the 1952 Constitution 
was very vague, leaving important details to be dealt with by 
additional legislation. A basic institution of the Supreme 
chamber of Control was omitted ,in this document and regulated 
outside the basic law (Sylwestrzak, 1986: 99). This 
situation could be explained as a continuation of alre~dy 
established authoritarian "constitutional practice". The 
unclear formulation of many provisions made it more con-
venient for the Communist party (PUWP} to intervene in act~~l 
law-making (through the Government) , without an obvious 
challenge to the constitution. In any event, no tribunal ~3s 
provided at the time for the purpose of legal review of th~ 
Sejm legislation or decrees, neither was there any instit~-
tion which could especially resolve cases of l~w viol~tin~~ 
by the state officials. The Sejm theoretically ~as an 
ultimate arbiter in such important cases, including the 
validity of election results {Jarosz & Zawadzki, 1987:339). 
The local state government system based on the 
People's Councils was a continuation from the early y~ars o! 
the com::".lunist rule.. This ti:;:ie it becane for·mally st!bor-
dinated to the supervision of the Council of State {art. 
27). How~ver, the nature of this "supervision" was =ot 
s~ecifi T~erefcre it was quite easy for the Co=.=.ur.~st 
party to control those local government units from outside o! 
the state govern~ent structure. The importa~ce of 
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control beca~e clearly visible in the new electoral ordi-
nance. 
The 1947 elections were the last ones to be based on 
the old proportional system of representation and party 
competition. The new law provided for only one list of 
candidates, placed on the single "national fro~t" ticket. 
officially, there were two other political parties, re~resen-
ting the working intelligentsia {Democratic Alliance-
Stronnictwo Demokratyczne - SD) and the peasants (United 
Peasant Party-Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe-ZSL} . ~e~er-
theless, their candidates and other independents {incl~di~g 
Catholic groups) were not allowed to campaign separately. 
The candidates for a co~mon ballot officially could be 
pr~posed by trade union~, women and youth or~ani=atio~s, 
p~~fessional associations, and other such groups. T~is ~~l~ 
~ould closely resemble the 1935 ordinance, cnly this ti~e the 
ulti~ate authority belonged not to the state as such, ~ut to 
a single party. The "state lists" were additionally 
Unlike the 1921 ordinance, this ti~e the purpose ~as not only 
to make sure that particular people get elected to the se:~. 
but also to provide an "ideal representation of a 
organized society" {C~kalski & Lity~ski, 1~87:1~' 
the actual takeover of the democratic idea of ele~tio~ ~~-
the purpose of t~e authoritarian ideology resulted i~ 
Preducing the display of approval for the polit~~3l syst?~. 
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A special chapter describing the rights and duti~~ of 
citizens seemed to have filled the gap created by the Little 
constitution of 1947. This was done mostly in accordance 
with the 1921 charter. However, besides basic individ~al 
rights, a new set of economic and social guarantee~ arp~ared, 
such as the right to work (art. 58) and leisure {art. 53). 
The wording of these laws emphasized that these provisio~s 
are "ensured on the increased scale", suggesting a progres-
sive nature of the constitution and the temporary nature of 
some laws. 
The basic divergence between the de~ocratic clai~s 
the 1952 Constitution and the constitutional practic~ 
notwithstanding, there were also so~e discernable a~thcrit~=-
ian tendencies in the document itself, the lntrod~ction -~ 
the Public Prosecutor's Office being only one exa~ple. T~e 
constitutional separation of the church and the St?.te 
another. Art. 70 guaranteed freedo~ of religion and 
conscience, but at the same time one clause declarec pu:lish-
ment for "the abuse of the freedom of conscience 3nd -o,.; _..; ""'-
- - -- :J - -·· 
for the purposes prejudicial to the i~terests ~f 
?eople's Republic". This was c!early ai=ed at 
appeared before 1939, such change would have be'=n r~~:'l.rd'e".1 
as a positive =~ve since the previous Polish co~stituti~ns 
aw3rded this particular religious institutic~ ~e'!::'y ~xte~si~e 
autono~y and power in the country's cult~ral and educati~n~! 
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affairs. The dominant position of the Catholic Church 
threatened the freedom of other religious and non-religious 
groups and individuals. After 1945, however, Poland bec~me 
nationally homogenous and overwhelmingly Catholic, which gave 
little credibility to regime claims that it intended to 
protect the rights of many other ethnic and reli;ious 
minorities. 
Similarly, as in the 1921 and 1935 Constitutions, 
duties of the citizens to the state were included alon;si 
their rights in the new law. Even if only one article (art. 
71) at the end of the chapter was devoted to these obliga-
tions, the duty to "safeguard and support social ?roperty" 
i~dicated a basic change of focus. The state protection of 
private property was replaced by the common respcnsibilit7 
for the state property, regardless of the fact th~t a li~it~~ 
sphere of individual economic activity was still per~issible 
(art. 10, 12). 
The law was surprisingly vague on the question cf natio~~, 
emergency. The Council of State could proclaim m~rti3l ~~~' 
on the parts or the whole territory, hut ~o clear res~o~-
amendments (art. 91} si~ply duplicated the 19~1 l :t'>r. G~ "',.e~ 
the new co~position of the Sej~, the Co~~unist p~~ty 
easily introduce constitutional changes. 
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The over3ll role of the Co~munist party in the Polish 
political system became a focus of constitutic~al debate 
during the subsequent years. The main idea w3s to for~all7 
acknowledge the already established ""' ..... ~,..... .. .; ...... e. ..;'I""\ r------- -·· 
priate provisions of the basic law. 
1. 
2. 
MOTES 
Previously, in the 1920s and 1930s, the Polish st~te 
acquired already so~e significant monopolies in the 
economic sphere such as, for example, tobacco and the 
railroads. 
See Polonsky and Drukier (1980) for the description of 
the beginnings of communist rule in Poland, 1944-45. 
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3 For the discussion on the oricrins of the 1952 Ccn$t~tu . ~ 
tion see Rybicki et. al. (1977). 
4. This party should not be confused with the pre-1939 PPS. 
Its pro-communist program repeatedly denounced the 
ideology of the mainstream Polish Socialists fro~ b?for~ 
World War II. 
s. The article numbers in this chapter appe~r in the or1er 
according to the amended version of the 1952 Constitutio~ 
as published by Triska {1968). In the re~aini~g ch?.~t=~~ 
the article numbers are given according to the ~e~ text: 
Konstytucja PRL, (1987). 
CHAPTER IV 
THE ROLE OF THE PARTY AND THE DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE IN COMMUNIST POLAND 
The post-World War II developments in Poland created a 
foundation for the dominant role of the Communist party in 
the political system. The Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) 
emerged in 1948 as a result of the forced cooptation of the 
Polish Socialist Party by the communist Polish Workers Party. 
The two non-communist political parties still in existence: 
the United Peasant Party and the Democratic Alliance as well 
as other independent organizations such as the small Catholic 
groups, were reduced to the role of "transmission belts" of 
the PUWP directives to all segments of the Polish society. 
The Origins of the PUWP Control in the Polish State 
The 1952 Constitution was proclaimed after the PUWP 
had already achieved its exclusive position in the country's 
political, social, and economic life. Furthermore, the 
announcement of the basic law occurred during a period when 
Polish national sovereignty was at its lowest point during 
the country's post-war history. Its Stalinist leadership 
could only be described almost as a virtual agency of the 
Soviet Union (Weydenthal, 1986:68-69). In his study of the 
Soviet bloc Brzezinski even suggests that the situation of 
the whole Eastern Europe at the time was in fact very close 
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to the actul3:":'.: i::iccrporation cf t!:"l.e satellite i'.'.Ol:ntries i::tc 
the Soviet Union as additional rnernber republics. However, 
the system of ideolcgically unifcr~ even if (in the :!arxist 
historical sense) lass adv~nced states, ~ppearad as ~ more 
convenient way to achieve the same political goals (Brzezi~­
ski, 1967:67-71). 
The situation of limited national independence was a 
severe burden on the Polish constitutional scholars who for 
the sake of legitimation of the party rule had to find a 
balance between the symbolic significance of traditional, 
democratic institutions and the influence of the Soviet 
model. The adoption of the new constitution in Poland was 
the last episode in the sequence of similar political 
developments in other East European countries (Appendix 1). 
The Polish state, and other People's Democracies as well, 
could not claim equality with the Soviet Union in terms of 
the already achieved stage of socialist development (Brzezin-
ski, 1967:80). Unlike in the Soviet constitution, the role 
of the party was not mentioned openly in the original text of 
the Polish basic law. Art. 1 of the Polish Constitution 
declar-d only that "the power belongs to the working people 
of town and country". 
As a transitional document describing only the initial 
phase of socialist construction the constitution could be 
interpreted by the party leadership in the ~ontext of the 
long-range goals of its program. At the same time, the legal 
significanc~-of the charter as the statement cf general =ules 
and procedures, ~hich were binding for the govern=ent ~nd 
~niversally accepted by ~he authorities, was greatly ~ed~ced. 
The PTJWP, like ".:)ther co:m::.\uni.st parties of the bloc, h.'3.s 
always clained that its legiti~acy as a leading political 
force was based on the historical, revolutionary p~ocess ".:)f 
change. The rules of the law must then clearly be sutcr-
dinated to the objective principles of this process. One of 
the Polish Marxist legal scholars explained this in the 
following way: 
Social regularities cannot be undone, one may 
only change the rules of the law which contra-
dict them, turning them [the rules of the law] 
into an authentic, not only illusory directive 
of the practice (Sokolewicz, 1978: 97). 
In the context of the Polish totalitarian state during 
the 1950s, the Constitution, in its original version, could 
have appeared as a document almost totally detached both from 
the practice of government operations and the real social 
expectations. The former was at the time based mostly en 
ordinary legislative acts which were not subject to constitu-
tional verification by any independent organs. Also, 
multipie decrees issued by the Council of State in fact 
replaced the legislative function of the Sejm {Jarosz & 
Zawadzki, 1987); (Appendix 2). Since all government branches 
had become a unified mechanism, the party became the ulti~ate 
regulator of their activity, supposedly acting in the name of 
the working class. As far as the public was concerned, ~he 
ccnstituticrr-and ether laws were in ~ractice the ~eans of 
50cializing the ~opulation, so that !t -ould utili=e the 
sti~g instituticns and exercise citiz2ns ~ights cnly ~er 
the purpose of displayi~g support for the system. 
Poland fellowed the path of ether Stalinist :cuntr~es 
where the Marxist-Leninist doctrine was interpreted in a ~ay 
which recognized the state only as a neans leading to the 
achievement of a visionary end of a future socialist society. 
This period in time was characterized by the decline cf 
i~portance of the state institutions (Brzezinski, 1967:88-
89). This fact had negative social and economic effect but 
was probably a reflection of the party leadership's belief in 
the quick success of their program. The use of constitution-
al practice allowed the party to interpret the legality of 
their action as they saw fit, according to the ideological 
directives and the demands of current policy. 
During the Stalinist period disregard for the law 
which the communists themselves had established reached 
extreme proportions, never again to be repeated in the 
history of communist Poland. The vigorous campaign of 
industrial development, social mobilization, and ideological 
indoctrination created a situation where the institutional 
structure of the state was perceived as an obstacle on the 
path to rapid development. The process of authoritative 
decision making by a very limited group of people who 
occupied simultaneously party and state positions (Politburo 
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and the Council of State or the Council of Ministers) 
dominated all spheres of country's life including education, 
culture, and religion. The decline in importance of the 
representative institutions was the most pronounced violation 
of the Constitution. (Jedruch, 198/:412-15). 
The fact that the 1952 Constitution has its origin in 
the period of the extreme totalitarian dictatorship of the 
communist Party (or more precisely its narrow Stalinist 
leadership) has had a profound influence both on the text of 
this document and on the problem of regime legitimacy. The 
document was worded in such a way as to approach the ideal of 
the Soviet model, even if the same level of development could 
not be claimed by the Poles having only a few years ex-
perience with the new system. At the same time, the Polish 
party leaders also imitated the political and economic 
practice of the "first socialist country." This attitude 
made them ignore the constitution as a legally binding 
document. The Polish state still existed, but its sovereign 
legal foundation had been turned upside down, which was to 
have a long-term effect on the legitimacy of the regime. As 
the contemporary Polish opposition writers explain: "while 
taking over the bourgeois state the communists declare that 
it becomes its own dialectical negation'' . "The party 
becomes identified with the state." (Cekalski & Litynski, 
1987:18) 
Party Monopoly on State and Social Organization 
And the Constitution 
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The dynamics of constitutional development and change 
since 1952 has been determined by the periodic reevaluations 
of the PUWP ideological doctrine and its policies. Poland 
experienced several important crises in its recent history. 1 
They had a profound effect on the party and some time later 
also the Constitution became influenced by the new methods of 
rule. The constitutional practice, altered to suit the "new 
course", usually preceded any debates over the real amend-
ments in the text of the basic law. The discussion over 
final legal reforms in the state law, even during the most 
sweeping changes of the 1970s, was officially presented in a 
manner which concealed the real scope of disagreement. 
Nevertheless, the Marxist scholars themselves contradicted 
the image of moral and political unity of the nation by 
conceding that some "small groups of people" actually opposed 
constitutional changes proposed by the party. In fact the 
opposition, especially from the Catholic Church, was 
widespread enough to force the party to make changes in the 
original projects for the amendments (Sokolewicz, 1978:27-
28) • 
The Constitution of Poland at each stage of change in 
the communist political system can be viewed as a reflection 
of: 1) the ideology of the party, based on the Marxist-
Leninist doctrine which stipulates the revolutionary 
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transformation of society; 2) the interpretation of the 
doctrine at each stage of Poland's socio-economic development 
in order to produce officially binding norms of state 
organization; and 3) the strategy of defending, maintaining 
and/or expanding the party monopoly of power. 
The ideological "superstructure" is expressed i~ the 
constitutional articles which describe the so-called 
fundamentals of the political and socio-economic system. 
Among these are the articles defining the role of the working 
class as the leading force ("the principle of the prin-
ciples"2, in Preamble, arts. 1,2,4,8/par.1); the centraliza-
tion of government (under direction of the parliament (Sejm; 
art. 20), the nationalization of economy (art. 11, par.2); 
and since 1976, the leading role of the Polish United Workers 
Party in society (art. 3). 
These basic elements of the political system play a 
special role in the Constitution. According to the Marxist 
legal interpretation they cannot be changed, even by 
amendments passed by the required 2/3 majority of the Sejm 
(art. 106). This reasoning is based on the premise that the 
socio-economic forces which operate in agreement with the 
laws of historical determinism are the superior regulators of 
the "super-structure", independent of the actual letter of 
the law. The systemic fundamentals therefore, are "relative-
ly constant", meaning that they themselves determine the 
direction of basic structural changes, at the same time 
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denying a possibility of amendments contrary to their spirit 
{Jarosz & Zawadzki, 1987:72-74). 
The most obvious shortcoming of this interpretation is 
the fact that the precise definition of the systemic funda-
mentals, expressed in very general terms by the constitu-
tional provisions, is formulated by t~e extra-legal actor-the 
communist party which, officially remaining outside the state 
structure, is, however, the only and final judge of the 
socio-economic reality. 
The ideology dictates to the communists a necessity to 
proceed toward an ultimate goal of social development - "the 
classless society". To declare victory at any given moment 
in time would undermine the very purpose of the party rule 
(Appendox 3). Therefore the state organization and the law 
are necessary aid in the continuous struggle for the 
realization of those distant ideals. Since the legitimacy of 
the PUWP leading role in Poland is not derived from either 
the national tradition or the people's consensus, but rather 
from the abstract notion of the historical principles of 
social development, it may appear that the public opinion and 
the individual citizens cannot become autonomous actors, 
capable of influencing the functioning of the state. 
Nevertheless, the first impression might be that the 
Constitution gives us evidence to the contrary. 
In order to properly understand the role of the 
constitutional guarantees of individual political rights 
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(arts. 81 par.1; 83-86) it is necessary to consider the 
ideological interpretation of these provisions by the party. 
The necessary precondition
1
for the exercise of the political 
freedoms and rights is not the existence of certain legal 
protections, based on "natural rights" of individuals. 
"Higher", extra-constitutional norms such as these are 
rejected by the Marxist legal scholars in Poland (Jarosz & 
Zawadzki, 1987:73). The guarantees mentioned in the basic 
law can be regarded as practically applicable only at a 
certain stage of social development. The precondition for 
the exercise of individual rights is usually a factual or 
assumed elimination of the remains of the former bourgeois 
state. The process of identification and interpretation of 
the stages of socialist development has been monopolized by 
the party apparatus. 
The exercise of independent opinion and changes in the 
internal party regulation are usually the first sign of the 
future reform in the state structure, the political life as a 
whole, and eventually, the constitution. However, the 
priority given to the unity of opinion in the party ranks, 
which is the core of the communist doctrine, discourages any 
attempts at independent action, not endorsed by the leader-
ship. Hence the functioning of the state organs is deter-
mined by the authoritarian decision-making conducted within 
the PUWP. The Leninist principle of "democratic centralism" 
which is the foundation of the party constitution also 
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affects the decision-making of the communist-controlled state 
organization. The Polish state, by being an organization of 
the whole society theoretically is more vulnerable to the 
regal challenge from the citizens than the party. In 
reality, however, it serves as a means of fulfilling the 
party program. In this fashion the organization of citizen 
participation in the state affairs cannot posses any neutral 
quality and becomes ideologically determined. An individual 
can either act in support of socialism or against it, the 
indifferent majority being either condemned as "creeping 
enemies" or praised as silent supporters, depending on the 
current policy directives and a particular interpretation of 
the Marxist-Leninist dogma (Cekalski & L~tynski, 1987:23-28). 
During the 1950s, the gradual liquidation of the so-
called "exploiting classes" - private businessmen and more 
af fiuent landowners - was accompanied by the elimination of 
all political opposition to the totalitarian rule in Poland. 
This situation created a political environment in which the 
constitutional guarantees, no matter how democratic they 
might have appeared, lost their practical significance. For 
the communists however, it was a very logical ccnsequence of 
the revolutionary social transformation, giving democracy its 
true meaning in a society devoid of antagonistic contradic-
tions (Appendix 3). At the same time, by adopting the 
bourgeois ideas and the political language of their op-
ponents, the party in practice made them appear totally 
meaningless. (Cekalski & Litynski, 1987:22). 
The Role Of The Party In The Revised Constitution 
The 1957 constitutional change following the period 
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of de-Stalinization in Poland was in fact rather modest. The 
only significant amendment was the new chapter providing for 
the Supreme Chamber of Control (an institution which had 
existed before the war and was gradually phased out during 
the initial years of the communist rule). The Chamber was to 
be subordinated to the Sejm, the principle which gives this 
organ an appearance of independence form the state ad-
ministration, whose activity it was supposed to control 
(Staar, 1962:36). Actually, the process of reform beginning 
in October 1956 was characterized by a legitimacy crisis 
which was only temporarily overcome, but .not due to the new 
emphasis on legality or the revival of the Constitution. The 
party was greatly aided in its return to full control by the 
charismatic leadership of its first secretary Gomulka, who 
was widely supported in society (Cekalski & Litynski, 
1987:22) and regarded as a defender of national sovereignty. 
Only much later, in 1976, the party proceeded to meet 
the challenge of a rapidly modernizing society by adjusting 
the 1952 constitutional model to the new demands of different 
socio-economic reality. Similarly to the period of early 
1950s the constitutional developments were the last formal 
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steP in contirming the party "achievements" in its task of 
socialist construction. The reform of the state was based on 
the premise that "moral and political unity of the nation has 
been already achieved" (Sokolewicz, 1978:77; xzjadz PZPR-
DokumentY i Materialy 1986:145). In this context, emphasis 
was put on the development of socialist democracy (art. 7), 
and broadening of citizens' participation in the government 
(art. 5 par. 2). The constitutional change during the 1970s 
was unique in a sense that many practices which for a long 
time had existed outside of the Constitution as established 
facts of law, often in apparent contradiction to its letter, 
were finally acknowledged in the text of the basic law. For 
example, the article ordering judicial elections was 
substituted by a clause which provided for the selection of 
the judges by the Council of State (art. 60; former art. 50). 
Also art. 51 (former art. 42) was changed in 1975 to provide 
for the direct state executive offices at the level of 
provincial administration. Long before, the Government 
actually exercised the local executive functions through the 
presidia of elective provincial councils. 
' The 1976 constitutional revision went considerably far 
with the formulation of more ambitious programmatic state-
ments in the political and socio-economic structural 
development. All institutional changes connected with the 
PUWP's new policy of "accelerated development" however, would 
be much less significant without the new art. 3, proclaiming 
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"the leading--role of the party in society". This provision 
merely acknowledged a long-established political fact, but at 
the same time the constitutionalization of the party role 
greatly expanded the scope of the fundamental principles of 
the basic law. 
Whereas the "rule of the working people" is a very 
vague statement and could be interpreted in various ways, the 
new article clearly indicated which force actually sets the 
pace of social transformation. This development occurred not 
without the external influences from other Soviet bloc 
nations which had reformed their Stalinist constitutions long 
time before Poland did (Jarosz & Zawadzki, 1987:83-90). Also 
the internal political and economic situation was not 
proceeding in the manner the communists have envisioned. 
There was a growing demand for new party policies and the 
laws had to be adjusted accordingly. 
The PUWP was aware of the fact that modernization and 
rapid economic growth caused rising expectations among the 
population. Rising consumption demands became a major issue 
of economic development during the leadership of the first 
secret'ary Edward Gierek {Mieczkowski, 1979). The party could 
ill afford to meet both the economic and political needs of 
the society if this would threaten its own power. The 
solution which emerged in the 1970s not only took the 
extensive economic growth for granted, thus neglecting the 
negative impact of industrial over-investment, but also 
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helped the party strengthen its position as the source of 
authoritarian decision-making in all spheres of life. The 
proposed, expanded organization of citizens participation 
that included new emphasis on the role of provincial councils 
as the local self-government unitsa, constitutionalization of 
the Front of National Unity (art. 3, pars.2&3), and the 
special emphasis of the role of the trade unions (art. 85) 
can only be viewed in the context of the PUWP's leading role. 
Instead of acting through a more rigid and vertically 
structured mechanism of directing the state and social 
affairs, the party cadres were to become the leading actors 
in the process of "developing socialist democracy'' (art. 7). 
For example, the provincial party secretaries in most cases 
automatically became the presidents of the supposedly self-
governing local councils (Sokolewicz, 1978:149). Thus the 
constitutional role of the local self-governing bodies was 
undermined since the party members who headed them were 
subordinated to the centralized hierarchical authority which 
in fact denied political autonomy to the local actors. 
The new state of socialist development proclaimed in 
Poland' under the Gierek regime and codified in the constitu-
tional amendments was a natural consequence of the process of 
evolutionary change in the basic laws of other communist 
countries. The leading or directing role of the Communist 
party was written into the Constitution of Albania in 1946 
(art. 56), Rumania in 1965 (art. 3), Czechoslovakia in 1960 
(art. 4) an~--Bulgaria in 1971 (art. 7). The Soviet Constitu-
tion of 1936 in art. 126 already declared that "the Communist 
party of the Soviet Union is the directing core of all 
organizations of the working people, social and government 
ones." The new 1977 Soviet Constitution, proclaiming the 
establishment of a developed socialist society, remained 
ideologically ahead of the other bloc nations. In terms of 
the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, Poland, still nominally a 
people's Democracy, while formally incorporating the party 
role into the basic law continued to lag behind its socialist 
allies. 
The new constitutional position of the party in Poland 
was a belated attempt to match the similar provisions in the 
laws of the fellow communist countries. The adoption of this 
amendment took place in the atmosphere of strong opposition 
from independent social groups (Sokolewicz, 1978:28). The 
Polish Constitution differs from the basic laws of other 
Soviet bloc nations (with an exception of the Hungarian 
charter) by the fact that in art. 3 it proclaims only the 
leading role of the PUWP in society, not in the state. The 
state is nominally directed by a coalition of parties which 
collaborate within the framework of a national front. The 
existence of the Front of National Unity in the 1970s was 
constitutionally confirmed in 1976 (art. 3, pars. 2 & 3). 
The function of this umbrella organization which, in an 
altered form, has survived until today was designed to 
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involve mor~-than just the two coalition parties: the United 
peasant Party and the Democratic Alliance, but also a number 
of officially sponsored organizations, trade unions, pro-
government religious groups etc. Such structure serves as a 
useful mechanism through which the party can exercise its 
control over the political process, being able to show at the 
same time that it shares the power with other non-communist 
groups. Polish independent political analysts point out that 
the party attempts to organize society and the state in a 
manner making it possible for a single political force to 
simultaneously exercise the roles of the creator of all state 
institutions, the major decision maker, the controller of 
state activity and the evaluator of policy results and 
administration procedures (Cekalski & Litynski, 1987:17). 
Political Crisis In The 1980s And The Affirmation 
Of The PUWP's Leading Role in Society 
In the early 1980s the PUWP found itself in a very 
precarious situation, facing the collapse of its economic 
policies and a severe political crisis. The communist rule 
was ch~llenged by the unprecedented wave of social protests 
and the necessity to preserve power overshadowed any other 
immediate concern of the party. The first big clash with the 
Solidarity movement occurred as a result of the authorities' 
demand that the independent union leaders officially 
recognize the constitutional role of the PUWP (Holzer, 
1982:119). 
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Changes in the constitution eventually became a means 
by which the new Jaruzelski regime attempted to both, 
legalize new emergency prerogatives of the government, and 
regain some measure of legitimacy for the compromised state 
authority. Immediately after the declaration of the martial 
law the very vague article art. 33 regulating special 
government powers was changed to suit the purposes of the 
military dominated regime. Under the old law, the Sejm 
approval, if the parliament was in session, had to be 
obtained before the martial law declaration on the territory 
of the whole country. On December 13, 1981 the Council of 
State ignored this procedure. Later, some Polish constitu-
tional scholars, using a rather voluntary interpretation of 
the basic law and the International Covenant on Political 
and Civil Rights, insisted that it was entitled to do so. 
Jarosz and Zawadzki point out in their argument that since 
the Council of State was confronted with a lack of constitu-
tional regulation in case of an internal emergency and the 
absenc~ of legislation pertaining to such situation, it was 
forced to use the term "martial law" and issue a special 
decree more suited to the circumstances (1987:289). Again, 
the phenomenon of constitutional practice became the driving 
force of the state law, leaving the actual text of the 
charter behind. Finally, in July 1983 the Sejm passed an 
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arnendroent to-·-the Cons ti tut ion (art. 33, par. 4} which 
specified the possibility of announcing a state of emergency 
on the whole territory of the country or on its part. The 
new law strengthened the power of the President of the 
council of State enabling him to issue emergency orders in 
cases when no delay is permissible. 
Simultaneously, two new institutions which were 
designed to oversee the legality of the official government 
action and the constitutionality of the legislation were 
introduced into the basic law. Constitutional Tribunal, 
created in 1982, was intended to replace the Council of State 
in its function of "guarding the constitutionality of the 
law" (art. 30, par.3 -passed in 1976, eliminated in 1982). 
This function actually had no practical significance in the 
activity of the Council (Jarosz & Zawadzki, 1987:78). 
Establishment of another body, the Tribunal of State signaled 
a return to the former model of overseeing the action of 
government officials, already present in the pre-war Polish 
constitutions. The Tribunals were not entitled to rule on 
the pre-1982 legislation and other political decisions of the 
regime'. Their creation was a part of the new regime policy 
of expanding socialist democracy. 4 Ironically, the timing of 
these reforms when major citizens' rights were suspended and 
all opposition groups had been violently crushed, did little 
to convince the population that from now on the government 
would adhere to the principles of legality. The new regula-
tions were rst of all devised f cr the purpose of preventing 
another outburst of workers' discontent in the future. 
(Cekalski & Litynski, 1987:14). 
The scope and intensity of legislative activity and 
law-making in general was quite overwhelming during the 
martial law {Appendix 2). This situation indicated not only 
a desire to eliminate those legal principles which during the 
period of Solidarity began to function in reality as 
restrictions on the PUWP monopoly (Cekalski & Litynski, 
1987:14). It also signalled the party leadership's intention 
to build a new foundation of its power in the precarious 
environment of social and political unrest, as well as in 
view of the disastrous economic conditions. 
The new interpretation of the socio-economic reality 
was a natural consequence of the pattern of socialist 
renewal within the party itself. The constitutional 
reflection of this development did not follow the pattern of 
multiple institutional and programmatic amendments as it was 
the case in 1976. Only a few alternations were made, which 
was quite insignificant if we consider the social and 
polit~cal impact of the recent Polish crisis. One of these 
changes was the replacement of the Front of National Unity 
(art. 3, par.2) by the Patriotic Movement for National 
Rebirth (PRON) . The very term ''rebirth" is indicative of the 
new course proclaimed by the party leadership. The founders 
of the movement stressed the more democratic character of the 
official ruling ccalition of parties and other organizations 
and in contrast to the previous system the inclusion of non-
party private citizens in its ranks was made possible. ~he 
previous proclamation declaring the moral and political unity 
of the Polish nation was officially abandoned while the 
regime's policy of national rebirth became a new credo, 
welcoming ideological diversity, but demanding political 
unity. (Jarosz & Zawadzki, 1987: 139) 
The significance of the constitutional changes as far 
as the ''democratization" of the government is concerned 
cannot be overestimated. The replacement of one "umbrella 
organization" by another does not mean that the PUWP ceased 
to exercise its leading role in society. What this reform 
really indicates is the need to regain some measure of 
support, (among the intellectual elite as well as the 
population as a whole), further undermined by the declara-
tion of martial law. The preconditions for participation in 
the movement are much less demanding now. The party welcomes 
access of all who do not actively condemn the communist rule 
and declare their obedience to the laws and the Constitution 
(X Zja~d PZPR-Dokumenty i Materialy, 1986:184). The new 
institutional solutions become once again a means to the 
practical realization of what Cekalski and Litynski call "the 
rule of non-ideological support" (1987: 36-39). This rule 
can be applied to the intra-party politics as well as the 
whole structure of state organization where the political 
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leadership w-i:ll not tolerate any alternative programs sither 
from the right or from the laft. 
The new ideological interpretation of the ?ol~sh 
situation was expressed in a more comprehensive way during 
the PUWP's 10th Congress in 1986. General Jaruzelski in his 
speech at the Congress called for a sweeping constitutional 
reform in the nearest future (X Zjazd PZPR:80). This 
declaration was later interpreted in the media and legal 
journals as a desire to introduce an all new charter (Kubiak, 
1987) . 
If the party proceeds with its plans, we will witness 
another example of a similar pattern when the constitutional 
change becomes the ultimate reflection of the political and 
socio-economic reality, as defined by the party according to 
its new interpretation of Marxist-Leninist ideology. This 
interpretation will have to acknowledge the lack of political 
and social unity in the Polish society as a permanent feature 
of the system. The methods of party interference in the 
state affairs and their legal implications, including 
constitutional amendments, will most probably change but the 
overal~ impact of the PUWP on policy-making is not likely to 
decline. It remains to be seen whether the reforms within 
the party are significant and influential enough to bring 
about a meaningful constitutional reform, making way for 
increased political pluralism. 
10 
A Search For New Legitimacy 
The important question that should be asked at this 
point is whether or not the party can ever succeed in 
overcoming the permanent legitimacy crisis of its rule, the 
crisis which the PUWP tried to deny by introducing the new 
art. 3 into the Polish Constitution in 1976 (the leading role 
of the PUWP in society). The legitimation of state authority 
in the communist systems can be described as derived from the 
ideologically determined leading role of the party and "the 
principle of popular sovereignty" (Brunner, 1982:32-33). The 
instrumental character of the state in a system dominated by 
one party of ten leads to the disregard for the autonomous 
role of the people. Georg Brunner points out that the 
doctrine of the "working people sovereignty" [emphasis added] 
helps the communists to bridge the gap between what the calls 
"the heteronomous-teleological legitimation" and "autonomous-
consensual legitimation" (32-34). The privileged position 
of the working class, referred to by the Polish constitu-
tional scholars as the "principle of the principles" (Jarosz 
& Zawadzki, 1987:121-122), and, as a consequence, the leading 
role of its avangard-the party is justified, since only this 
class is capable of directing the process of socio-economic 
change. The party is justified in assuming political 
leadership for as the working class representative it 
possesses ''higher consciousness" of the historical processes 
(Brunner, 1982:34). 
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Sinc~-the monopoly of the party en choosing the right 
political course is not open to challenge, all branches of 
state government are expected to act in unity en the 
realization of PUWP policies. The doctrine rejects 3 
possibility of conflict within the government. It is a 
consequence of the assumption that unlike the bourgeois 
society, the socialist one has overcome the antagonistic 
contradictions and hence has no need for the free play of 
QOlitical forces, [emphasis added] either in the party, the 
government, or the society at large (Jarosz & Zawadzki, 
1987:130-134}. 
The rejection of conflict as a legitimate phenomenon 
cannot obscure the reality which produces constant confronta-
tion, either on the smaller scale in day to day decision-
making or in the wider sphere of open political opposition to 
the party policies, and most importantly to the very 
fundamentals of its rule (like for example during 1980-81}. 
Some constitutional changes since 1952 have originated from a 
necessity to find such substitutes for conflict resolution 
mechanisms which would both neutralize the opposition and 
help maintain the monopoly of party control. 
The Marxist-Leninist ideology notwithstanding, the 
rejection of conflict among political forces within the 
government and in the society at large is linked to the power 
factor. The free play of political forces would very well, 
in a country with its own democratic traditions such as 
poland, "ea&-~o a situation where the Communists beco~e :nly 
3 small 3nd insignifi:ant minority party. The -evoluti~nar7 
r:ature :: the PUWP systero. of :-ule nakes it impossibl~ 
overcome the dialectical distinction between only two 
recognizable political fcrces-"the enemies and the c:ll:.es". 
BY denying legitimacy to "the enemies" the regime renders all 
constitutional guarantees of political freedoms obsolete. 
unable to deny that unity has not been achieved in the Polish 
society yet (Jarosz & Zawadzki, 1987:139; Appendix "!I ._: j I the 
party attempts to better organize all social groups as 
ideologically neutral, but supportive "allies". Similarly, 
within the government the new institutional changes serve the 
purpose of enhancing self-control of the centralized 
structure, officially headed by the Sejm (the two Tribunals), 
rather than granting autonomy to any of the branches. The 
methods and the extent of such control are determined by the 
PUWP apparatus which can choose between exercising political 
pressure through its government representation (in the 
legislative, the executive and judicial institutions) or by 
utilizing the so-called institutions of social control 
(Workers and Peasants Control, People's Assessors in the 
Courts, local and industrial self-government, etc.). 
The constitution is a document where the most 
important elements of the party program are revealed in a 
form which includes both the programmatic outline of a 
conflict-free society and the institutionalization of those 
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contradictions which still exist in Poland and have to be 
reckoned with at the present level of development. Without 
openly admitting the existence of political, social and 
economic conflicts the party usually chooses either to ignore 
them (as in the 1970s) or to define them in such a way as to 
justify them as transitionary phenomena, caused either by the 
political enemies or by the mistakes of the previous, 
denounced leadership (1980s). 
In the text of the constitution, the problem of 
political conflict has been dealt with in two ways; either by 
tacit institutional adjustments behind the screen of a 
unified governmental structure or by open admission that some 
long lasting features of the present Polish reality need to 
be recognized. The former serve to perpetuate the existing 
model of authoritarian decision-making, the increased 
possibilities of self-control notwithstanding. The latter 
concerns the social and economic spheres and is the official 
admission of the fact that the conditions in Poland have so 
far failed to evolve according to the socialist model (Jarosz 
& Zawadzki, 1987:104-105). The process of institutional 
adjustment within the government structure in Poland is 
linked to the concept of socialist democracy, the term being 
a derivative of the narrower principle of democratic 
centralism. 
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~ociali~t Democracy And Evolution Of The Party Rule 
The concept of a democratic state in the Leninist 
doctrine acquires a rather ambiguous meaning. On one hand, 
democracy is a bourgeois phenomenon, which will eventually 
become irrelevant in a future communist society (Lenin, 
1987:55). On the other, the party of the working people is 
capable of transforming a state of bourgeois democracy into a 
state of the true, working people's democracy. This apparent 
contradiction is present not only in the ideological sphere, 
but occurs in reality of actual state activity in communist 
ruled Poland. The PUWP, in its direction of the state 
apparatus, is at least formally obliged to adopt some 
institutional procedures in order to legitimize its claim for 
a "higher" form of democracy. Simultaneously, the actual 
demands of the state bureaucracy, which has become used to 
following only party directives, make it very hard for any 
reformer to hold the officials accountable, even to the 
communist controlled representative institutions of the 
government. 
Should the quasi-democratic constitutional mechanism 
of working people rule prove too vague or inadequate to the 
functioning of the PUWP dominated state organs, the official-
ly recognized constitutional practice allows for law 
modifications through ordinary legislation and executive 
action without too frequent recourse to constitutional 
amendments. Still, some constitutional scholars complain 
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that such pr-crvisions as art. 106 of the basic law are not 
enough guarantee to avoid frequent amendments since basic 
political agreement is an undeniable fact in "socialist" 
parliaments (Jarosz & Zawadzki, 1987:71). Recent develop-
ments in this area have shown a tendency toward greater 
precision of the basic law, which would eliminate the 
necessity of constant review or legal contradictions in 
actual constitutional practice. Nevertheless, despite the 
creation of the Constitutional Tribunal the extra-constitu-
tional, voluntary interpretation of the basic law is still a 
common phenomenon in Poland.~ 
The state and society under communist rule can fulfill 
their instrumental roles only if their organization can be 
made compatible with the officially permissible methods of 
pursuing the goals of socialist construction. The vague 
nature of the original Polish 1952 Constitution was partly 
due to the fact that the transformation of the society could 
not have been undertaken the way the party intended it to 
happen if the state apparatus had been bound by too many 
restrictions. 
' Ever since the collapse of the Stalinist dictatorship 
the Polish communists have become more aware of the fact that 
their successful rule depended on a more flexible organiza-
tion of the state and society in general. 
The evolution away from the totalitarian police state 
towards an authoritarian one-party regime involved such 
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elements as~-1} a more precise division of responsibilities 
between the party and the state in governing the country; 2) 
the participation of the citizens in the process of governing 
connected with a better organization of public support for 
new policies; 3} an acknowledgment of the fact that certain 
divergencies from the model of socialist development do exist 
and class antagonisms are likely to survive longer than 
previously expected; 4) connected with the previous point is 
the recognition of the Polish way to socialism (not without 
influence from the USSR after the famous 20th Congress of the 
CPSU), and the emphasis on Polish national symbolism. 
In consequence of the most important crises after 
1956, during the 1970s, and later in the 1980s, the above 
factors were included in the constitutional debate sponsored 
by the ruling party elites. However, the eventual amendments 
to the charter which followed turned out to be either too 
controversial (the proposed clause about the eternal 
friendship with the Soviet Union, discussed in 1976), or 
practically insignificant (the 1957 introduction of the 
Supreme Chamber of Control), and in most cases they came too 
late eo make the difference and help prevent a serious 
political crisis (both Tribunals after 1981). 
The key to understanding those periodic attempts at 
constitutional reform lies, apart from the ideological 
consideration, in the party strategy and its ability to 
utilize institutional and organizational solutions in a 
manner whidr·could satisfy popular discontent with previous 
policies and deceive the opposition during a legitimacy 
crisis. At the same time, the party domination has to be 
preserved in all areas of social activity. 
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The ability to adopt certain democratic concepts as 
their own enable the Polish United Workers Party to project a 
more credible image of the reformed methods of rule. At the 
same time, the doctrine of the communist movement remains in 
force and as such helps turn the reforms into their own 
negation. 
From our analysis the PUWP emerges as the political 
organization which struggles both to preserve its ideological 
unity and undisputed monopoly of power, especially during 
periods of political and economic crisis. Constitutional 
changes appear in this context as somewhat belated attempts 
to legalize the consequences of the already accepted 
directives, derived from new party programs. The dynamics of 
constitutional change, however, can also be viewed as a 
result of a more complex, gradual process of one-party regime 
evolution in Poland. 
'In his study of authoritarian politics, Samuel P. 
Huntington concentrates on the evolutionary aspects of one-
party rule. He recognizes three stages of this process: 
transformation, consolidation and adoption. Modernization of 
society leads to the transformation of a "revolutionary one-
party system" into an "exclusionary one-party system". It 
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usually occurs when the social and political opposition to 
the authoritarian rule have been eliminated. Ideology serves 
the legitimation purposes of the new regime, whereas the 
party membership, expanded during initial revolutionary 
phase, is purged (Huntington & Moore et al. 1970:15-23). 
This process corresponds to the situation in Poland during 
the 1950s when the constitution went into effect, but its 
programmatic, ideologically determined significance over-
shadowed its legal meaning as the supreme law. 
The consolidation of one-party rule is characterized 
by a declining need for ideology. The party has already 
established its monopoly of power and now begins to seek 
justification of its rule in "institutional rather than 
ideological characteristics" (27-28). After 1956, the PUWP 
in Poland consolidated its rule, but mainly on the basis of 
its popular leader Gomulka and the hopes associated with the 
emergence of reformist groups within the party. The 
constitution was only marginally affected, but the new 
electoral ordinance of 1957 added to the expectations of 
major institutional reform (Staar, 1962:60). Throughout the 
1960s,' the consolidation of the authoritarian party rule was 
marked by the regime's "downplaying of its own ideology and 
everyone else's" (Huntington and Moore et al., 1970:28-29). 
The actual constitutional practice of that period led to 
decline of representative institutions (Appendix 2) as well 
as politicar-and economic stagnation (Weydenthal, 1986:122-
146) • 
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The adaptation phase, Huntington points out, means 
further "erosion of ideology", which process "tends to reduce 
the difference between political needs as seen by the party 
elite and technical-administrative needs endorsed by the 
managerial specialists" (Huntington & Moore et al. 1970:33). 
At the same time, "the fundamental identity between the 
populace and the system tends to be assumed" (38}. The 
constitutional changes of 1976 in Poland could be seen as a 
result of this evolutionary phase of one-party rule. 
Nevertheless, the falsity of this projected image of national 
political unity became obvious during the 1980s when the PUWP 
all but collapsed under the social pressure. 
Huntington argues that "a reasonably stable and 
effective authoritarian system may exist with only a weak 
party". He adds that "when such regime confronts crises the 
party tends to reemerge as the most important actor" (9). 
What happened in Poland during the 1980s cannot exactly be 
explained by this reasoning alone. The ultimate solution to 
the Polish crisis in 1981 was conceived by the security and 
military apparatus with close cooperation with the Soviet 
commanders of the Warsaw pact. At that time the party 
control and authority in the country was at its lowest and 
the Politburo's directing role was replaced by Jaruzelski's 
strategic command. 6 
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In the period of 1982-1986 the Jaruzelski regime tried 
to turn the rebuilt PUWP again into the most inportant actor 
in the process of national renewal and democratization. 
However, already at this point, the fact that in order to 
secure greater effectiveness of the new regime in all spheres 
it is necessary to reduce the party monopoly has been 
recognized. 7 The future will show whether a reformed 
constitution will recognize the increased role of non-party 
groups and individuals in the state. So far it becomes 
increasingly evident from the officially published discus-
sions that the needs of party leadership in the ongoing 
process of reform come to conflict with those of the 
modernizing society. 
The constitutional changes which already took place 
during the 1980s, and others expected in a few years, are 
intended to put more emphasis on the legal aspect of state 
organization (Constitutional Tribunal, Tribunal of State) and 
stress the renewed attempt at building a seemingly coali-
tion-like system of rule {Patriotic Movement for National 
Rebirth). However, only the practical adaptation of the 
party ~o the new demands of political and socio-economic 
situation, plagued by socio-economic stagnation and political 
apathy, can bring meaningful change. 
The final adoption of a new constitution can be 
expected to take place as a result of institutional and legal 
experiments the PUWP is trying out at present during its 
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efforts to overcome the loss of ideological appeal and 
political influence among the population. It is doubtful 
that the process cf change of the authoritarian party rule 
in Poland can be stopped or reversed in the nearest future. 
During the 1970s ~he adaptation of authoritarian decision-
making to the rapidly modernizing society appeared realistic 
in the context of promising economic results. In contrast, 
in the 1980s there is no doubt about the gravity of the 
situation. 
The constant legal and political debate in the Polish 
media is a sign of change, but also of political instability. 
Encouraged by Gorbachev's reforms, but faced with lack of 
popular support, the regime appears unable to find a working 
solution out of the stagnation. Even if the PUWP leadership 
comes forward with a substantial institutional reform 
package, the fundamental, constitutional foundations of the 
system are not likely to be affected. On the other hand, the 
programmatic role of the constitution can only be enhanced, 
but oriented towards the more immediate goals of the 
socialist, democratic renewal instead of the more optimistic 
and more distant goals of a mature socialist society. 
The national character of the Constitution, including 
the emphasis on the specific Polish features of the socialist 
economy and a creation of a broader base for citizen 
participation in state affairs, seem to be crucial elements 
of the present reform. These elements are also connected 
with the off~cial recognition of the important role, which 
the Catholic church has come to play in Polish society. 
The next chapter will analyze the genesis and 
development of certain tendencies in the Polish basic law 
which correspond to the specific domestic conditions. 
Despite its monopoly on policy-making the PUWP is forced to 
take these factors into account in its program formulation 
process and the approval of certain constitutional amend-
ments 
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NOTES 
1. The most important crises in Poland's recent history 
occurred in : October, 1956, March 1968, December l970, 
June 1976, and most recently during the period of 
"Solidarity" frc::n August 1980 until December 13, 1981, 
{when the martial law was declared) . 
2. For a iliore detailed discussion of this concept se~ 
Jarosz and Zawadzki {1987:112-122). 
J. Article 43 changed former article 34 which labeled the 
provincial People's Councils as mere organs of state 
administration. 
4. See Jaruzelski's speech before the Sejm on January 
25, 1982 in Jaruzelski (1985:41). 
5. See "Opinie", Lukaszczuk, L. vice-president of the 
Constitutional Tribunal, in Polityka, No 18, 1988. 
6. For details see an interview with Ryszard Kuklihski, a 
member of the general staff of the Polish Army, in 
Kultura (Paris} No 4, 1987. 
7. See: An interview with Swiderski, J., director of the 
PUWP Central Committee's Department of Personnel 
Policy, "Na szachownicy", in Polityka, No 20, 1988. 
CHAPTER V 
THE INDIGENOUS CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC AND THEIR REFLECTION IN THE CONSTITUTION 
The Marxist-Leninist ideology of the ruling Communist 
party in Poland determines the long-time role of the consti-
tution in that country. The dynamic nature of the basic law 
is represented by its programmatic content, adhering to the 
basic line of the party's doctrine of progress towards a 
future ideal society. Any changes in the text, therefore, 
are expected to be a part of the ideologically mandated 
process of socialist development. 
From 1947 until the mid-1950s, the Soviet Union was 
accepted throughout the Eastern bloc of communist countries 
as an ideal model of "socialist" state organization. During 
the 1950s the Polish regime attempted both legal and extra-
legal methods in order to bring about the transformation of 
the Polish society in accordance with the Stalinist pattern. 
The political crisis of 1956, which took place within the 
PUWP and stirred the Polish society, revealed the futility of 
such policies. It became clear that certain specifics of 
Polish political and socio-economic conditions cannot be 
overlooked if the communists wanted to realize their program 
and gain at least some measure of popular following. 
The decline of Stalinism in Poland disclosed amazing 
ineffectiveness of the party and state apparatus in their 
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struggle against traditional Polish social and economic 
forces. The Catholic church reemerged from the period of 
severe prosecution during the early 1950s as a strong, 
independent partner in negotiations with the.new party 
ieade~ship. Also the abandonment of the collectivisation 
campaign proved the strength of the Polish peasants and 
their traditional bond with private land ownership. 
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Another phenomenon of the Polish reality which had to 
be dealt with by the communists was the existence of 
political opponents of the regime. The devastating influence 
of World War II and the subsequent policy of terror and 
intimidation, conducted by the Soviet-supported authorities, 
led either to the complete elimination of independent 
political organizations or to the incorporation of some 
decimated and reorganized non-communist groups into the 
official network of state controlled associations. Under the 
totalitarian rule, the party directives were to be unanimous-
ly accepted by all quasi-independent political groups. Their 
existence served mainly legitimation purposes. They were 
useful to the communists in so much as they could demonstrate 
effective support for the system, supposedly in the name of 
all classes, professions, and religions. 
The acknowledgement of specific Polish conditions has 
never been clearly formulated in the basic law, leaving many 
legal problems to be resolved by means of ordinary legisla-
r 
' 
tiOn and decrees within the constitutional practice defined 
bY the current party policy. 
The post-World War II history of Poland gives us 
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evidence that the problem of incompatibility between the 
forcibly imposed communist model of rule and the indigenous 
polish conditions cannot be resolved within the narrowly 
conceived doctrine of Marxism-Leninism. The daily practice 
of governing and the strength of both the traditional and the 
newly emerged political and socio-economic forces caused 
frequent readjustments in the party programs according to the 
demands of Polish reality. These events eventually affected 
the Constitution. It has to be added, however, that in most 
cases the perception of social and economic reality by the 
party leadership did not correspond to the needs and 
expectations of various interests and groups among the Polish 
population. The programmatic assumptions and the general 
institutional framework of the state basic law remained 
unchanged until 1976, despite the pressures of the rapidly 
changing society. 
The constitutional regulation of the three most 
important surviving elements of the Polish reality which do 
not conform to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of building 
socialism has been handled in different ways by the party 
leadership. These elements include: the strong Catholic 
Church, a tradition of individual freedom and political 
Pluralism, and the private ownership in agriculture. 
97 
The separation of church and state (art. 82 par. 2; 
former art. 70 par.2) was meant to deny the Catholic religion 
a privileged position it enjoyed in Poland before the war 
under the 1921 and 1935 constitutions. Even if the religious 
freedoms were guaranteed (art. 82 par.1 ; former art. 70 
par.1) the situation of the Church as an institution was left 
out from constitutional regulation to be dealt with by 
ordinary legislation and administrative decisions. 
Along with the rejection of ideological pluralism the 
need for political pluralism in a western bourgeois sense of 
parliamentary democracy was rejected by the communists. 
Nevertheless, certain nonantagonistic class differences and 
interests were recognized within the common framework of a 
socialist state. A national front was created in the form of 
a coalition of friendly parties, as well as the social, 
professional and religious organizations. Also direct forms 
of citizen participation were promoted as the "rule of the 
working people", guided by the party. 
The existence of the national front, including the two 
additional political parties: the United Peasant Party and 
the Democratic Alliance, was not specified in the Constitu-
tion until 1976. In the 1970s a greater constitutional role 
was granted to other organizations such as the trade unions. 
During the 1980s, largely as a result of social pressure, the 
new movement for "national rebirth" (PRON) was conceived to 
incorporate a slightly wider spectrum of individuals and 
not directly associated with the PUWP (art. 3 par. groups, 
3) • 
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In the late 1950s, in place of the old opposition, 
practically non-existent since 1948, new political forces 
emerged, determined to challenge the regime from within. 
Three separate sources of political dissent, which became 
evident after 1956, can be distinguished. One of them was a 
50-called "revisionist" group within the PUWP itself, 
represented among others also by disillusioned former 
stalinists. Also, a· spontaneous workers rebellion against 
deteriorating living conditions and human rights violations 
exemplified by the June 1956 Poznan revolt turned out to be 
another danger to the party totalitarian rule. Last but not 
least, a group of Catholic intellectuals, close to the 
episcopate, attempted to organize some type of legal 
political opposition in the Polish parliament - the Sejm. 
All these expressions of dissent had one common 
characteristic - they aimed at the reform of the system, not 
its destruction. They unanimously accepted the realities of 
Polish geopolitical situation and the post-Yalta European 
status quo. The 1952 Constitution was recognized as a 
foundation of their activity. 
In contrast to the Catholic Church and the political 
opposition, the agricultural structure was a subject of a 
more detailed constitutional regulation from the beginning. 
However, the early guarantees for individual farmers were 
r 
99 
iargelY offset by the statement of long-term goals indicating 
the socialist transformation of the villages. While 
recognizing the importance of private farming, the regime 
failed to secure necessary guarantees for the peasants either 
in 1952 or later during the 1976 constitutional changes. 
onlY in 1983 a constitutional amendment finally recognized 
the individual family farm as a "lasting [emphasis added] 
element of the socio-economic structure in Poland". 
constitutional Position of the Catholic Church in Poland 
As an overwhelmingly Catholic country with a long 
tradition of Church's influence in the national affairs, 
Poland occupies a special place among the East European 
countries. Since the beginnings of their rule, the Polish 
communists were faced with a difficult situation where they 
had to deal with the Catholic Church as a significant social 
and political force. A very immediate need of the new regime 
after 1944 seizure of power was to determine the role of 
religious institutions in the Polish state. The crucial 
factor of that Polish reality in the late 1940s was the 
difference between the apparent and the actual power of the 
Catholic Church. 
Weakened by the war losses and deprived of the special 
legal protection provided by the previous 1921 and 1935 
constitutions, the Church could have appeared vulnerable to 
Political pressure. On the other hand, its traditional 
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authority and following in the Polish society could hardly be 
ignored. The new regime initially promised religious 
tolerance, restrained from confiscating Church property 
during the early days of agricultural reform, and expressed 
hopes for cooperation with the clergy and the believers in 
building Poland's future (Szajkowski, 1983:9; Markiewicz, 
1984:56). Thanks to its continuous authority among the 
population and the cautious but firm strategy of its leaders, 
the Catholic Church managed to preserve its integrity and 
strength throughout the Stalinist period. 
In its attempt to undermine the role of the Church in 
the Polish society the PUWP conceived several political 
moves. The first important step was a denial of constitu-
tional guarantees both to the Church as an institution, and 
especially to the Catholic majority in Poland. In September 
1945, the provisional Warsaw government moved to break the 
1925 concordat between the Polish state and the Vatican. 
Since then the Communist party has been consistent in using 
several other methods intended to undermine the influence of 
the Church. 
While guaranteeing freedom of conscience and religion 
to every citizen, the 1952 Constitution stressed the separa-
tion of church and state (art. 70 ; now art. 82). The new 
regime, by assuming a role of a modernizing force in society, 
Undertook a vigorous secularization campaign in this 
Predominantly Catholic nation. The party justified this 
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action not only by emphasizing the demands of a modern state, 
but also the necessity to protect the "equal" status for 
other minority religions has always been was stressed 
(Markiewicz, 1984:110). 
After 1945, when national and religious minorities in 
poland constituted only a very small percent of the popula-
tion, such argument does not appear convincing. Given the 
hostility of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine to all religions 
it is hard to imagine the communists acting as mediators 
between different religious groups. Quite visibly at the 
time, all legal regulations of the Church's status were 
subordinated to the demands of an atheistic, C~mmunist-party 
ruled state. 
In eftect, the permanent consequence of the 1952 
constitutional solution has been a formal declaration of 
equality for both believers and non-believers and an open 
denial of any institutional legal recognition for the 
Catholic Church. Under other circumstances, this situation 
might not have appeared very alarming, but the reality of 
Polish socialist law denied the Church a status of a legal 
body. Therefore, this religious institution could not rely 
on independent judicial protection against administrative 
decisions, used frequently in the party struggle against the 
clergy (Szajkowski, 1983: Notes 17:25). The regime was aided 
in their action also by art. 70 par.3 of the Constitution 
which stated that the use of religious freedom contrary to 
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the interests of the Polish People's Republic was punishable 
bY law. In the atmosphere of "intensified class struggle" 
during the 1950s any activity of the Church leaders and the 
clergy could be interpreted as harmful to the interests of 
the Polish state. Dnring the period of severe prosecution 
in 1953-55 several prominent church leaders, including the 
polish Primate Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski, were imprisoned by 
the authorities. 
The position of the Church and Catholic religion in 
the Polish post-war constitutional order has been determined 
by the communist regime's failure to regulate the legal 
status of this largest religious body. However, repeated 
attempts were made to define more precisely the role of the 
believers in the state and ~ociety, including their par-
ticipation in the officially recognized organizations. 
As the Church-state relations in Poland evolved from 
the early stage of confrontation until the most recent period 
of normalization, the official interpretation of the 
constitutional norms pertaining to these relations changed 
accordingly. Due to the denial of legal status, the Catholic 
Church as such is not referred to explicitly by the 1952 
Constitution. On the other hand, Polish constitutional 
practice may serve as an illustration of the changing 
interpretation of the Church's role by the party leaders, who 
have often tried to reconcile the atheist Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine with the domestic social conditions. 
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The separation of Church and state has always formed a 
basis for the Communist party policy towards religion in 
poland. (art. 82 par. 2; former art. 70 par.2). Freedom of 
religion is formally guaranteed by art. 82 par.1 (former art. 
70 par.1). Equal rights for all believers and non-believers 
are provided in art. 67 par.2 and art. 81 par.1. Art. 95 
refers to the voting rights which are granted to everyone, 
whatever his or her beliefs may be. 
In 1976, a few important changes were made in the 
basic law. This could have left some impression that the 
communist rulers of Poland had come to recognize, in some 
way, the lasting presence of the Church and its followers in 
society. The paragraph 3 of the former art. 70, providing 
for legal punishment in case of misuse of religious freedom, 
was eliminated from the text. New art. 67, which stressed 
the progressive nature of citizens rights and freedoms in 
Poland, now includes a statement of equal rights without 
regard to sex, birth, education, profession, nationality, 
race, class origin, social status and religion. 
Despite the improving atmosphere in Church-state 
relations, the constitutional role the Catholic clergy, the 
believers, and their organizations were to play vis-a-vis the 
Polish state has been a subject of various conflicting 
interpretations. While trying to analyze the communist 
Position, as expressed by the PUWP and its leaders, one 
cannot fail to notice numerous contradictions, most no~ably, 
in regard to the fundamental principle of division between 
church and state. 
There is little doubt that the communists wanted to 
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avoid the return of a powerful Catholic Church as an 
independent institution with a pre-war legal status and 
prestige. At the same time, however, this religious institu-
tion had always been an essential element of the social 
reality and its cooperation or at least friendly neutrality 
had to be won in order to successfully complete any program 
of social and economic transformation. 
Before the actual 1952 Constitution was passed, the 
party leadership had abstained from an open attack on the 
Church. Instead it tried to damage the link between the 
Polish episcopate and the Vatican. In addition to breaking 
the concordate, the authorities proceeded to set up splinter 
groups of "patriotic priests" among the clergy and organize 
pro-government groups of "progressive Catholics" (for example 
the PAX association). Such maneuvers have remained a vital 
part of the party strategy until today. 
The official standpoint of the communist authorities 
on the issue of church-state relations is expressed by a 
Polish author Stanislaw Markiewicz. He points out that "the 
principle of separation between Church and state cannot be 
treated inflexibly" (Markiewicz, 1984:244). Such attitude 
stems from the partial and informal recognition of the 
Church's social role in Poland by the state. The Catholic 
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church is the numerically largest of all religious denomina-
tions. While it has always strived for legal recognition and 
meaningful partnership with the state in solving the 
country's social problems, the communists also frequently 
used other, legally recognized representations of minority 
religions to counterbalance the influence of the Church. 1 
The manipulation of the principle of religious 
equality serves the political aims of the party and the state 
which recognized legal status of the minority Christian 
groups, while denying the same privilege to the Catholic 
Church. Lack of constitutional regulation in the sphere of 
important relations between the Catholic majority and their 
Church leaders, on one side, and the atheistic state and the 
party leadership, on the other, led to the creation of a 
legal vacuum. This gap has been gradually filled with 
various settlements creating a modus vivendi.2 
Despite minor changes in 1976, the communists never 
openly admitted that the 1952 Constitution with its program-
matic vision of a classless, conf~ict-free society, failed to 
acknowledge the existence of the basic ideological contradic-
tion in the Polish society: between the majority Catholics 
and the Marxist minority. In the 1970s, the party leaders 
grew even more convinced that a socialist state can be 
created on the basis of national unity, consisting of 
Marxists and progressive Catholics joined together by their 
common moral and political goals. This assumption proved to 
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be a gross oversimplification of the Polish reality. Most 
recently, the Marxist writers themselves reject such claims 
as unrealistic. The contemporary official interpretation of 
this ideological division is leaning towards a negotiated 
truce 1 respecting the constitutional foundations of the 
polish state (Markiewicz, 1984:119-200 & 212). 
Markiewicz, quoting the classifications published by 
the Polish minister for religious affairs, Adam Lopatka, 
explains seven fundamental principles regarding the constitu-
tional position of the Church and religion in the People's 
Republic of Poland. The first one pertains to the equality 
of rights and duties of all citizens in spite of their 
religion or beliefs. Second is the rule designating freedom 
of conscience ana religion a private matter of each human 
being. The third principle allows for the free exercise of 
religious functions by churches and religious groups. The 
fourth one deals with religious tolerance: "it is illegal to 
force someone not to attend or participate in religious 
ceremonies; and to compel a person to do it"(Markiewicz, 
1984:110). The next principle concerns the separation of 
Church and state. The Polish Marxist scholars attribute to 
this the elimination of religious symbols and rituals from 
the public life {secularization of state institutions}. The 
additional rule regulates the legal status of the Church. It 
must be dealt with only by the Polish law. Therefore, any 
concordate with the Vatican is excluded because "it would 
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violate national sovereignty". Finally, the state guarantees 
equality for all religious groups regardless of their name, 
or the number of believers (Markiewicz, 1984:110-111). 
From the above classification we can distinguish some 
basic facts which are ch~racteristic of the constitutional 
regulation of religious affairs in most communist countries, 
including the USSR. This concerns primarily the separation 
of Church and state. In this context under the socialist law 
the state is empowered to deny autonomy to any religious 
institutions. Also the state protection is especially 
extended to non-believers who "cannot be forced to par-
ticipate in any religious ceremonies"(ll0-111). In the 
Polish circumstances such regulation acquires a special 
significance and in fact serves often as an excuse for 
spreading atheist propaganda (Chrypinski, 1981:246) through 
the secular state institutions. The authorities try as well 
to use the law against the rights of the Catholic majority, 
whose role in government has always been minimal under the 
communist rule. 
Nevertheless, the influence of the Church and the 
Catholic population in the state affairs cannot be totally 
underestimated despite the lack of meaningful and guaranteed 
participation in the government decision-making. Within the 
broadly understood constitutional framework, the Church 
leaders, as well as the Catholic layman have tried to find 
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some room for independent political activity. Such attempts 
met with a varying degree of success. 
Due to the lack of institutional regulation of their 
activity and the failure to organize a political party as 
earlY as 1946 (Szajkowski, 1983:10), the Catholic activists 
and intellectuals had to choose between compromise and 
defiance in their relationship with the PUWP. A compromise 
would have meant active participation in the official 
structures, and this in fact was an obvious sign of support 
for the atheistically oriented Marxist state. Defiance could 
have been interpreted by many Catholic Poles as a preserva-
tion of integrity and independence, but also, under the 
Polish circumstances, could result ~n effective isolation 
from any influence on public affairs, not mentioning hostile 
attitude of the government. The strong position of the 
Polish Catholic Church and the authority of its episcopate 
has been for many years the main source of support for many 
people who opposed the official communist ideology, not only 
the believers. The strength of the Church during this 
confrontation with the state, has been largely due to its 
flexible social strategy. This included such interpretation 
of the constitutional order that made use of many vague 
guarantees for which the basic law of Poland provided in 
1952. Unlike the Hungarian Church, whose leadership adopted 
an openly anti-communist attitude during the 1956 uprising, 
the polish Church not only managed to survive, but also 
continued to increase its influence in society. 
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This situation so far, has had some effect on party 
policy. It contributed to the constitutional redefinition of 
the coalitional form of government (art. 3) to include 
formally the non-Marxists (non-party members) in the broader 
definition of the national front. Since the 1970s idea of 
the basic moral and political unity behind such "coalition" 
of social forces collapsed in 1980, it became increasingly 
difficult to find a new constitutional concept to replace it. 
It must be remembered that such concept of "sharing power", 
for example, with the Catholics, in the Polish circumstances 
has to conform with the leading role of the Communist party. 
Due to the most recent political and social develop-
ments in Poland, the Polish United Workers Party had to de 
facto acknowledge the lasting phenomenon of ideological 
opposition, corning mainly from the Catholic majority, but 
also increasingly from other secular groups, emerging within 
the Solidarity movement. The lack of constitutional for~ula 
for conf lic~ resolution has led to a situation where the 
communists engage in prolonged negotiations with the Church, 
trying to build new consensus on the existing constitutional 
foundation. The lack of constitutional guarantees is not as 
threatening to the Church as it is to the political opposi-
tion. While the episcopate has been able to preserve its 
Power and expand its social role in spite of the difficult 
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legal situation, the opposition groups, even the Catholic, 
ones have neither the prestige nor the political resources to 
successfully preserve their autonomy within the existing 
structure of the Polish' state. 
The growing power of the Church in Poland is due to 
several political factors which strengthen its bargaining 
position. These include the authority and influence among 
i 
the population, the efficient negotiation strategy and the 
favorable international situation. The last of these factors 
is most visibly expressed by the election of the Polish 
cardinal Karol Wojtyla to the highest Vatican office. This 
has been, undeniably, the greatest outside influence on the 
Church-state relations during the last decade. 3 The 
immediate result of these developments has been the inten-
sification of diplomatic contact between Poland and the 
Vatican. 
Denied legal recognition, but never avoiding active 
engagement in social and often also political life of the 
nation, the Church has not failed to exert its influence on 
the constitutional developments in Poland. Considered the 
only independent voice able to.speak up for the Polish 
citizens in a state ruled by the communists, the episcopate 
has managed to influence the party policy. The political 
leadership of the country, over and over again, has had to 
come to terms with the phenomenon of a strong ideological 
opponent. 
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In the modern history of Church-state relations, 
several distinct periods can be distinguished. In this study 
the focus is primarily on the position of the Church within 
the Polish constitutional order. This position has shifted 
from that of a moderate support to the open criticism of the 
system. Most notably, in 1952, the new constitution was 
officially supported by the Church hierarchy, which at the 
time suffered severe administrative restrictions and feared 
further deterioration of its position after the exceptional 
agreement with the state authorities signed in 1950 (Szaj-
kowski, 1983:15). 
The 1956 "thaw" brought about another agreement with 
the state and led to the unprecedental bishops' call on the 
believers to take part in the upcoming Sejm elections in 
January 1957. 
During the 1960s and the 1970s the Church frequently 
called on the government to respect the constitutional 
freedoms and the agreements signed by the representatives of 
the episcopate and the state. In 1976 the most significant 
protest of the Catholic Church and independent intellectuals 
took place. The revision of the Constitution, proposed by 
the PUWP on its I Plenum in December, 1975 included three 
important amendments: 1) the institutionalization of the 
leading role of the party; 2) the article referring to the 
"unbreakable alliance with the Soviet Union" as the founda-
112 
tion of Polish foreign policy: 3) making the citizens rights 
dependent on the fulfillment of citizens' duties. 4 
As a result of Church's pressure the first of these 
amendments was put in a little milder form, defining the 
party as the leading force in society, not the state. The 
alliance with the Soviet Union was mentioned only as one of 
the principles of Polish foreign policy, the phrase "unbreak-
able" was dropped altogether. The last amendment was 
eventually rejected (Chrypinski, 1981:255). Official Polish 
constitutional scholars later acknowledged the fact of 
discarding "certain proposals which could have been under-
stood as incompatible with the idea of sovereignty" (Sokole-
wi CZ I 19 7 8 : 8 4 ) • 
In 1977 and 1978, the Church stepped up its demands 
for legal recognition and the creation of independent 
Catholic student and workers organizations which could 
participate in political life of the country. However, the 
party position remained stable on the issue of Church-state 
relations, based in fact on the conscious exclusion from the 
constitution of the special role which the Catholic Church 
actually plays in Poland (Szajkowski, 1983:53-60). 
The constitutional regulation of the separation of . 
Church and state in Poland cannot be considered only in the 
context of a conflict between a religious and a secular 
institution. In a Marxist-Leninist state we are dealing with 
a conflict between the state ideology, which is atheistic in 
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principle and any other independent expression of ideas that 
are perceived as a threat to the political status quo. The 
government sources in Poland have claimed that the modern 
polish state should actively oppose all "clerical tendencies" 
in social and political life (Markiewicz, 1984:1q4). The 
same theme was repeated during the X Party Congress in 1986. 
since in the Polish political system the state cannot be 
considered a neutral force any comparison with the seculari-
zation of public life in modern democracies does not appear 
correct in this case. In Poland, the process of evolution in 
Church-state relations has been dominated by an open struggle 
between two opposing ideologies, instead of a legal contest 
or a parliamentary constitutional debate. 
A crucial factor in the PUWP traditional policy 
towards the Church in Poland has been a denial of the legal 
status that could match the real significance of this 
institution in the reality of Polish politics and society. 
The extra-constitutional regulation of religious institu-
tions, as mentioned in art. 82 par.2 still appears to be tr.e 
main foundation of Church-state relations in Poland. On the 
other hand, the necessity to institutionalize such relations 
led to the creation of some alternative frameworks for 
negotiation. The Joint Commission of the Representatives cf 
the Government and the episcopate was created in 1957, but 
became an active body only in the 1970s. Now, it appears to 
be a lasting element of the Polish system. 
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The negotiations and agreements signed in 1950 and 
1956, as well as frequent meetings between Church and 
government or party leaders, have sought to fill the gap left 
bY the lack of legal regulation in these matters. The 
expanding social role of the Church could not be stopped 
despite administrative restrictions, and the authorities had 
to come to terms with this fact, albeit reluctantly {Markie-
wicz, 1984:230). Another area of activity which supplemented 
these developments was the increase in diplomatic contacts 
between the Pplish government and the Vatican. 
After the martial law declaration in Poland the role 
of the Church has undergone a significant transformation. 
The triangle of political and social forces that emerged 
during the 1980-81 in the form of the communist government on 
one side, and the Catholic Church and Solidarity, on the 
other, was altered dramatically. Since 1982 the authorities 
have left open only one feasible channel of communication 
with the independent groups in society - through the Church 
and its leadership. 
As the only institution capable of mediation between 
the government and the society, the role of the episcopate 
has increased in the 1980s. The lack of corresponding legal 
improvements in the status of the Church is still in 
evidence, in spite of the renewed negotiations in this matter 
{Monticone, 1986:194). Despite the changing social reality 
and lack of credibility, the communist regime in fact has 
continued its traditional policy throughout the 1980s. 
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The key elements of this policy are the support of 
pro-government "progressive Catholic groups" such as PAX, 
polish Catholic Social Union (PZKS) and others, and the 
stress on the common participation of both non-believers and 
believers in the party program of socialist construction. 
The organization of the believers, therefore, is continuously 
regarded as a part of a larger, state controlled system of 
officially recognized associations. This situation creates a 
conflict with the Church which considers itself responsible 
for the activity of the people who identify themselves as 
catholics. While the mediatory role of the Church has been 
accepted by the party as merely a necessary prerequisite to 
successful policy implementation, the organization of the 
believers by the communist authorities is now regarded as a 
lasting element of the Polish socialist state structure. 
Previously considered only a transitory phenomenon, the 
ideological differences have not "withered away". In order 
to maintain its ideological and political monopoly, the party 
has attempted to force the Church and the believers into a 
temporary legal framework, denying them lasting constitution-
al guarantees of participation in the nation's political 
life. 
The .Polish Constitution contains the articulation of 
certain systemic fundamentals which must be accepted by all 
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social and political forces willing to take part in the 
public activities of any kind. The lasting quality of these 
fundamentals stems from the rigid nature of the Marxist-
Leninist doctrine which demands the acceptance of one 
particular theory of social development. The interpretation 
of this doctrine, however, by the party leadership is often 
forced into a compromise with the current policy require-
ments. The lack of clear guidelines in the state law and a 
presence of the ideological and geopolitical facts that are 
exempt from criticism or challenge, creates a necessity for 
frequent unofficial or extra-constitutional action. The 
search for a substitute modus vivendi is evident in the 
history of Church-state relations in Poland. 
Instead of being regulated by the neutral law, 
religious affairs in a communist country become a domain of 
political and ideological struggle where the clergy and the 
believers on one side, and the state and party apparatus on 
the other, play the main roles. The thin line between the 
acceptance of the constitutional order and the open challenge 
to the communist system is walked constantly by Polish 
ideological and political opposition. 
The Constitution and the Reality of Political Opposition 
in Communist Poland 
Any analysis of political opposition under the 
communist system in Poland has led to a clear distinction 
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between the officially recognized expressions of disagreement 
with certain government policies, and various independent 
groups which choose to criticize the regime from the outside 
of state institutional framework. The confusion here may be 
caused by the fact that almost al 1. governmental and indepen-
dent actors claim that their freedom of action is guaranteed 
by the Constitution and other laws of the republic. New 
recognition given to the growing number of political, 
economic, and ideological trends within the Polish society 
by the government press in the late 1980s makes the situation 
even more puzzling. The Marxists-Leninist doctrine ceases to 
be the only, all encompassing argument of the regime in its 
propaganda campaign againsi the independent opposition.~ 
Poland, being a communist country, in its constitution 
recognizes only the existence of non-antagonistic class 
contradictions. The interests of the leading social force-
the working class, the peasants and the progressive intel-
ligentsia are supposed to be united in the common task of 
socialist construction. The revision of the basic law in 
1976 was aimed at the development of socialist democracy 
through an institutional arrangement which corresponded to 
the interest of a united society, treated as an already 
accomplished fact. 
The communist theory of democracy distinguishes 
between the indirect and direct forms of citizen participa-
tion in governing. The former is realized through the 
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elected representatives, in the Polish case: the Sejm and the 
people's Councils. The indirect form includes "the develop-
ment of various structures outside the representative 
institutions: social consultations and control, and the 
self-government" (Sokolewicz, 1978:70). According to the 
Marxist scholars, the mature socialist state should be 
characterized by the growing importance of the direct 
democratic forms. This is also the important reason why they 
claim the superiority of the socialist democracy in com-
parison with the "bourgeois" one where the representative 
system of rule supposedly acts only in the name of the 
dominant exploitative social classes. 
The leading role of the working class, according to 
this theory, eliminates the necessity for constant political 
bargaining among different interests. In a socialist 
society "the political power of the working people is 
realized not only through state structures and institutions, 
but through the whole system of a political organization of 
society whose particular elements remain in constant 
relationship and influence one another" (Sokolewicz, 
1978:62). Such system of political and social organization 
is considered the proper representation of the working cl~ss 
interest. It is directed by the Communist party. In effect 
this situation leads to the social world which "appears to be 
Perfectly planned and organized, leaving no room for new er 
simply different initiatives" (Cekalski & Litynski, 1987:17). 
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In spite of the dominant position of the communists in 
government, Poland is not officially considered a one-party 
state. The ideologically determined model of socio-political 
relations expressed by the Polish constitution provides for a 
three-party system. 6 The parties are distinguished by their 
class representation. This situation, envisioned at first as 
a temporary alliance of the working class (the PUWP) with t~e 
peasants and the left-wing intellectuals, became a lasting 
element of the Polish political structure after the 1976 
constitutional revision (art.3). Article J was subsequently 
amended in 1983 to include a slightly wider spectrum of 
groups and individuals in the newly created Movement for 
National Rebirth {PRON) which replaced the compromised Frcnt 
of National Unity {FJN'; 1976-80). 
At the same time, the leading role of the working 
class was affirmed by adding paragraph 2 to art.4 which 
states that "the Polish People's Republic [ ... ] expands the 
participation of workers in considering the matters of the 
state, society and economy, and strengthens the worker-
peasant alliance". The recognition of the peasant role is 
yet another element of the Polish system which deserves 
attention and will be discussed later. 
The Constitution defines the fundamental structure ~= 
political forces in Poland which are based on the class 
alliance and the leading role of the PUWP. The reference to 
the citizen participation in governing is, however, put in 
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very vague terms. Art. 5 par.2 declares that the state 
Hensures citizen participation in governing and supports the 
development of various forms of working people self-govern-
ment". The freedom of organization and association (art.84), 
however, does not equal pluralism in politics and society. 
Paragraph 3 of art. 84 prohibits the creation of, and 
participation in organizations which are opposed to the 
political and social system of Poland. Since the party is 
guaranteed the leading role by the Constitution, it becomes 
the ultimate judge of what organization can potentially 
threaten the system. 
Despite the idealized vision of a perfectly organized 
society, the struggle among conflicting political, . ., sccia., 
and economic interests has always been hard to deny the 
reality in communist Poland. The opposition to the party 
programs, to government policies and to the political and 
socio-economic structure in general, has expressed itself 
from the outside of the regime as well as from tha inside. 
The occurrence of periodic political and economic crises and 
lack of mechanisms for conflict regulation contributed highly 
to Poland's internal instability. The real situation 
contradicted the ideal picture of systematic socialist 
progress envisioned by the drafters of the 1952 Constitution. 
From the beginnings of the communist rule in Poland, 
the non-communist political organizations were assigned a 
specific role in the revolutionary process of social char.ge, 
121 
conceived by the party ideologues. Their existence was 
justified in class terms, and remained valid as long as the 
party could use such organizations as "transmission belts" 
for the implementation of its policies. 
The disappe;rance of the pre-war Polish political 
parties by 1948 practically meant that the only real 
autonomous institution which survived in Poland was the 
catholic Church. The subsequent challenge to the party rule 
has been either a derivative of the persistent strength of 
catholicism in Poland or an unintended product of the 
communist system itself. The PUWP, in its struggle for 
political legitimation, created a system of social, political 
and legal organization which has been used against the party 
monopoly by the supporters of democratic reform, and evolu-
tionary change towards greater pluralism. The constitutional 
foundation of the Polish state, in its present vague form, 
has served as a legal basis for al~ost all opposition 
activities and claims, 7 originating both from the Catholic 
activists and the intellectuals of the political left. 
The party interpretation of the "people rule", 
guaranteed by the Constitution, has not remained constant. 
Pariodic relaxation in the practice of authoritarian co~trol 
led usually to the more open constitutional debate over 
increased democratization, political pluralism, and greater 
citizen participation in government. Some independent 
groups, such as the Catholic organization "Znak", during 
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1956-76, attempted to influence the system through the 
constitutional means. For many years the small group of 
"Znak" deputies acted as virtually the only independent voice 
in the Polish Sejm, the body dominated by the PUWP and its 
allies. In a gesture of compromise towards the Church, one 
of the Catholic deputies became a member of the Council of 
state during the 1970s. 8 In 1980, another Catholic politi-
cian, Jerzy Ozdowski was admitted to the post of deputy 
prime minister. The majority of independent intellectuals, 
however, remained critical of the official policies from the 
outside by organizing discussion clubs, petition drives, 
hunger strikes and other forms of protest, trying all the 
time to keep their action within the legal constitutional 
limits. Some prominent dissidents such as Jacek Kuron, 
a former party ideological expert - Leszek Kolakowski, and 
most rece.ntly Adam Schaff tried to exercise the right to 
independent criticism from within the party itself. 
Several periods of intensified opposition activity 
Poland have been characterized by the growing popular 
dissatisfaction with the methods of rule exercised by the 
party and state apparatus. The constitutional fundamentals 
have been rarely challenged. 9 The focus of the oppositioii's 
activity did not remain on the validity of the socialist 
development as the main goal of state activity. What has 
been questioned, concerned rather the different interpreta-
tions of the word "socialism" and disagreement over the means 
which should lead to the achievement of the social goals, 
promised by the communists. 
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The party leadership, despite constant challenge from 
the independent groups, has been highly reluctant to change 
the law or basic policy directions, even if these could be 
justified within the realm of the doctrine. Even in view cf 
the permanent crisis of legitimation and the crumbling 
economy, the regime opted for temporary maneuvers and minor 
concessions, instead of meaningful reform. The important 
constitutional changes, if passed, were designed to serve as 
the future safety valve in order to prevent threats from the 
opposition, instead of incorporating the already existent 
political and social forces into the system by meaningful 
legal guarantees. This inflexibility of the communists in 
dealing with social and political instability can be 
considered the evidence for the systemic resistance to 
reform. So far, there has been no sufficient proof that 
party would be willing to protect its ultimate task of 
socialist construction by explicitly allowing meanin~f~l 
opposition in the Polish constitution. In the meantime, t~e 
basic law serves both the government and the unofficial 
opposition as the legal justification of their activity. T~e 
vague nature of the provisions and the lack of a real, 
independent tribunal which could produce authoritative 
judgments in the constitutional sphere help perpetuate 
Political instability. 
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The overt actions of the Polish dissent groups and the 
growth of the independent social movements during the 1970s 
created a serious dilemma for the party leadership. The main 
voices among the opposition did not call for the overthrow of 
the constitutional order, but rather demanded necessary 
reforms in the political and economic practice of governing 
{Weydenthal, 1986:175-177). The most famous independent 
action proposing a comprehensive program of political refor~ 
was undertaken by the Experience and the Future Discussion 
Group. In 1979 it prepared a special report called: Poland 
Today. The State of the Republic {1931). 
This text contained a detailed critique of the party 
and state organization as well a~ the practice of govern~ent 
in Poland of the late 1970s. The contributors who par-
ticipated in this survey-type project were selected fro~ 
people of various political orientations, including Co~munist 
party members. Instead of advocating the replacement cf 
corrupt and inefficient rule of the PUWP, they proposed 
constitutional changes leadin~ to more party control over 
government and the extension of democratic practices in the 
party and state structures. Some of these proposals are 
still important today, since they have resurfaced duri~g the 
recent public debate over the political renewal and denocra-
tization in Poland. 
Poland Today stated that the law in the country has 
become "a tool of political expediency" {20) and that "t!:e 
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system's lack of self-regulatory mechanisms leads to the 
perpetuation of particularistic interests" (30). As a remedy 
to this situation a division of power was proposed, where 
"the party should act through the representative bodies and 
perform its control, supervisory, evaluative, and corrective 
functions in this way" (120). A greater constitutional role 
for the representative institutions (Sejm, People's_ Councils) 
was advocated. 
Additionally, an electoral reform was proposed (121}, 
and special emphasis was placed on the creation of an 
independent Administrative Tribunal to safeguard citizens' 
rights versus the state administration (125). Creation of an 
Ombudsman's office was also called for.1° 
All these changes were designed to reform the existing 
system and took for granted the fundamental principles cf the 
political and socio-economic structure established by the 
1952 Constitution. The authors, however, stressed the 
necessity "to respect the values of socialism in practice, 
such as the right to work, social help, access to culture and 
the right to express opinions"(ll6). The openness of 
political life was described as the prerequisite for any real 
refo=m (116). ~he issue of national sovereignty was also 
emphasized in connection with the ambiguous constitutional 
regulation of Poland's foreign policy principles {art.6) 
( 103) . 
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The increased opposition activity during the 1970s had 
its origin in the realization that a wide gap had been 
created between the constitutional promise of socialist 
democracy and the reality of political practice. It became 
all too visible that tt~he [1970s] decade has demonstrated the 
total inability of the present system to deal with economic 
and political problems in a rational way and to work out a 
long time strategy for development" (177). 
The Experience and the Future Group urged immediate 
government action on legal, constitutional, and administra-
tive reforms. They also stressed the importance of self-
government and autonomy for different social groups. This 
problem was the focus of attention in the strategy of major 
opposition movements. Their l3aders advocated legal, but 
autonomous self-organization of society, in order to reveal 
the government violations of its own laws. 
The Committee for Workers' Defense (KOR), the 
Independent Trade Unions, and other unofficial or;anizations 
followed the strategy of petitions, appeals, protest lette=s 
·and hunger strikes to force the authorities to obey the 
spirit of the state law. Their activity originated in 1975 
when first efforts were made to reveal gross human rights 
violations of the regime, committed in result of workers' 
strikes. 
A prominent Polish dissident ~acek Kuron remarked that 
"all democratic opposition [in Poland] must realize its 
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democratic aims of parliamentary democracy and national 
sovereignty by using peaceful means ... ,this movement must aiili 
at reforming the system, not changing it" (Kuron, 1979:145). 
Also another opposition leader Adam Michnik stated clearly 
that "the road of evolution is the only w~y for the dissi-
dents of East Europe" (Michnik, 1984}. 
This reformist and realistic attitude, it can be 
argued, is first of all a product of specific geopolitical or 
strategic conditions which exist in Poland. However, on the 
other hand, the origins of the contemporary Polish political 
opposition, excluding the Catholic Church as a special 
phenomenon, can be traced for the most part to the revision-
ist trends within the PUWP. Jacek Kuro~, and other prcminent 
party members, while rejecting the system in its totalitarian 
form, never wholly abandoned the ideology of the political 
left. At the same time, any opposition leader in Poland must 
be aware of the fact that the Polish society and the 
political culture in the country is constantly under-going 
change under the influence of the present system. The 
society as a whole seems willing to "accept a certain 
compromise with the people representing the interest of the 
Soviet Union in ruling the country" (Kuron, 1979:213). 
From the above argument we can venture an opinion that 
tha opposition leaders in Poland consider the PUWP regime as 
the representative of foreign interests. The constitutiona: 
order has been conceived as a legal basis for these inter-
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ests. However, it also has, over the years acquired certain 
national characteristics making it easier for the population 
to identify with some goals of the socialist development. 
Especially this last factor may help the opposition accept 
certain fundamental provisions of the state law as the basis 
for compromise with the ruling party. The program of 
i 
"social organization", designed to counter the official 
monopoly on public activities, created an alternative for 
independent interest articulation in a country governed b~ 
the communists. 
This program became more feasible after the 1980 
workers' revolt. The PUWP was faced with a dilemma of hew to 
answer the demands of the working people who in fact desired 
the realization of the very same promises of democratization, 
civil rights, and the welfare state which the communists 
included in the 1952 Constitution. 
Ironically, this refers also to the special role o! 
the trade unions in the Polish political and economic syste~ 
(art.SS), as well as the increased participation of othar 
citizens organizations in public affairs (art.84). Tte party 
program in the 1970s envisioned a perfectly or;anized 
structure where the party and state apparatus exer=ises 
control over all organizations and social groups: trade 
unions, youth organizations, professional associations, etc. 
Similarly, the freedom of the working people to use 
"printing presses, paper resources, public buildin~s. 
129 
communication systems, radio and all necessary equipment" 
(art.83 par.1) acquired a new meaning since the social 
organization created after August, 1980 became independent of 
state and party direct control. The Independent Trade Union 
solidarity attempted in 1981 to take advantage of the 
constitutionally guaranteed access to the mass media. This 
led to the severe conflict with the authorities (Karpinski, 
1985:84). 
Jan B. de Weydenthal in his recent study of the 
Polish Communist Party points out that in the 1980s "the 
explosion of activism [in society] was not conceived or 
directed against the existing system of government, its 
institutions and its leaders" (183). Nevertheless, there ~s 
little doubt that the party leadership despite their 
declaration of support for "democratization" felt threatened 
in their monopoly on power (187}. 
The Polish regime used two major arguments to justify 
the constitutionality of their actions aimed against the 
independent organizations, primarily the trade union 
Solidarity, during 1980-81. The party emphasized its leadin~ 
role in the Polish society and demanded that all independa~t 
or;anizations openly acknowledge this fact. Secondly, the 
regime focused its attention on the revitalization of the 
easy manipulated pro-government trade unions and other ~uasi­
independent social and political groups. The communist-
ccntrolled networ]{ of such organizaticns has been labellec 
the "Third Force" (Trzecia Sita} by the Polish opposition 
(Cekalski & Litynski,1987:35-40}. 
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The United Peasant Party and the Democratic Alliance, 
along with some pro-communist Catholic groups such as PAX and 
neo-Zna~· 11 as well as the officially recognized trade unions 
and youth organizations, constitute the core of the Third 
force. Its existence, according to the communists, should 
make all other independent opposition in Poland unnecessary. 
The party has for a long time attempted to demonstrate that 
the "language of ideology", expressed also by some constitu-
tional provisions, being completely out of touch with 
reality, might "assume an appearance of an actual oppor-
tunity" (50}. 
The events of the 1980s proved that only this 
officially recognized form of political opposition - the 
"Third Force" is permitted to function in the Polish legal 
system. After the declaration of martial law any exp~ession 
of dissent within those organizations was eliminated t~ ~ake 
them unanimously supportive of the Jaruzelski regime. 12 
The complex political composition of the contempor~=Y 
political opposition in Poland makes it impossible to 
describe here all programs and attitudes towards the przsz~~ 
constitutional order and the communist system as a whols. 
the late 1970s a cartain consensus has emerged among the 
Po:ish dissidents of various political orientations. Most o~ 
them consider it either unrealistic or unnecessary to change 
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t .... ... . , .t: d ... 1 .t: b the cons i~u~iona~ ... un amen~a so ... t.e present systerr.. The 
future of contemporary political and economic reform and in 
consequence also the future of the opposition depend on the 
party leadership's willingness to negotiate with those 
independent groups. While the consensus on the status ~uo in 
Europe cannot be avoided, in such negotiations the scope of 
feasible political change is viewed differently by both 
sides. The chance for a compromise was already lost once 
1981 when the martial law was declared. 
The governments willingness to accept the Catholic 
church as the permanent mediator in its dealings with the 
opposition signifies an important policy change. A govern-
ment spokesman hinted recently that the consultative role o! 
even those people who are opposed to the communist syste=. 
should be includec in the future reform of decision-making 
processes on the highest levels of government. 1 ~ Also many 
suggestions appeared in the party press which indicates 
possibility of allowing other political parties or even so=.e 
real, for example Christian Democratic opposition in the 
Sejw. 14 
It has to be stressed, however, that the "li~eraliz3-
ticn" of party policies and the results of the o!ficial 
political dabata in Poland have often fallen short of 
change in the state law, the statutes, or finally the 
constitution itself. The recognition of the Polish ow~ 
to socialis~ of ten ccnes into conflict with ths Xarxist-
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Leninist fundamentals without which the whole system would 
appear groundless. The party agricultural policy is t!'le 
example of how difficult it is to reconcile the Polish 
reality with the doctrine, especially wh~n some constitution-
al amendments have to be made. 
The Phenomenon of Private Farming in 
the Constitution of Communist Poland 
Any constitution of a Marxist-Leninist state places a 
special emphasis on the economic sphere. The important rcla 
of socio-economic relations, especially the relations 
production, is dictated by the Marxist interpretation of the 
principles regulating the whole sqciety. The state itself 
occupies a special pcsiticn as the main agent of economic 
activity in the process of systemic transformation from 
capitalism to socialism, and later communism (Jarosz & 
Zawadzki, 1987:181). 
While most constitutions of East bloc countri~s 
already proclaimed the full socialization of their eccncmi;s, 
Yugoslavia and Poland still retain the varied pattern cf 
economic activity. Jarosz & Zawadzki distinguish t~=ee types 
of property as indicated in the Polish constitution: s0cial 
(socialist} property, (w%ashosc spo%eczna); smallholder 
Property (w%ashosc drobnotowarowa) and capitalist property 
(w!asncsc kapitalistyczna) (183). 
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There are ten fundamental articles of the Polish · 
constitution which regulate the country's socio-econo~ic 
structure, art.5 and arts.11-19. In 1976 three of them were 
changed. The direction of this change was mainly towards 
further affir~ation of the privileged position granted to 
the socialized property. 
Article 5, paragraph 2, declares that "the People's 
Republic of Poland strengthens the socialist property". 
replaced former art.3 which in paragraph 4 described th; 
T"" 
....... 
state's duty "to restrict and eliminate the social classes 
living from the exploitation of workers and peasants". !n 
the 1970s, this goal was judged not significant enou~h any 
more to merit a constitutional declaration (Sokolewicz, 
1978:57). 
Article 11 in paragraph 1, announces that the 
"socic:.l t economic system, based 9n the socialized mEans 
production and the socialist relations of production ~ !:'" J.,. \.,, :-:. 
•..J -·--
bas:..s cf t:he socio-econonic structure [in Poland]". 
before as art.7 this provision was less explicit in e:::p!:as i -
z~n~ the ~ocialist nature of the econo~y. However, 
stressed already that the state economic policy was to ~e 
~ased en a ·national plan. 
The unique character of the Polish socio-economic 
structure is largely due to the abandonment of f orcec 
collectivisation in agriculture. No other ~or.stitutio~ 
a~y Soviet bloc cou~try ~ut tr.a Pelis~ c~e p~cvides ce=t~~~ 
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guarantees for private farming. Article 15, paragraph 3, 
changed in 1976, guarantees state protection for the farms of 
the individual working peasants. Designated formerly as art. 
10 it declared only the state protection against "capitalist 
exploitation in the villages" (paragraph 1). It also 
provided for the "voluntary [emphasis added] creation of 
peasant cooperatives". Paragraph 3 of the same article 
increased the role of the state in agriculture by the 
creation of state machine stations. 
The abandonment of the Stalinist agricultural policy, 
which had not been completed before early 1970s, did net 
mean the departure from the main socio-economic goals, 
envisioned by the communist doctrine. New article 15, 
paragraph 1, still emphasizes the aims of socialist transfc~-
mation in the countryside. Similarly article 11 remains 
unchanged as the main directive of all economic activity 
Poland. 
The situation of Polish agriculture and the constit~-
tio~al definition of private farilier's status i~ the co==u~~st 
system has been determined by the evolution of PUWP poli=y. 
This policy, des~ite frequent clai=s to the cont~ary, c~~~ct 
for a longer period of time neglect t~e specific conditicns 
cf the Polish village. The traditional factors such as t~e 
century old peasant struggle for land and its equal dist~ibu-
tion has played a major role here. 
1J5 
The 40-year experience of party agricultural policy 
has resulted in some important legal changes. Since the 
forced socialization of the farms can only lead to a total 
economic disaster, all the party can hope for is a gradual 
incorporatinn of individual or so-called family farms into 
the socialist system of production. 
The present policy of increased tolerance towards 
private farming began in 1956 with the major shift in party 
policy. The abandonment of collectivisation campaign also 
paved the way for future improvement in the constitutional 
status of Polish individual farmers. The actual policy 
the party and the state administration, however, during 
1960s and later during the 1970s, aimed mainly at the 
socialist transformation of the agriculture through gradual 
changes, endangering the position of private landholde~s 
(Korbonski, 1981:272-77) 
The policies of the Gierek regime during the 1970s, 
designed to improve overall economic performance, incl~din; 
agricultural productivity, did not cause increased peasant 
confidence in the system. Open preference was still shewn 
for the socialized sector while "highly productive individ~al 
farms were seen as an obstacle on the road to socializ~tio::" 
(288). 
The continuation of party policy leading to the 
event~al socialization of Polish agricultura finds its 
constitutional justification in article 17. This provision 
r 
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declares that "the state accepts [emphasis added] individua.:::.. 
p~operty in two forms: smallholder and capitalist ones and 
provides f cr the legal protection of thereof on the basis cf 
the binding legislation". The Marxist scholars point cut 
that this rule "entails the possibility or even duty of the 
statutes to regulate and limit capitalist property [ ... ], 
total liquidation is not ruled out". (Jarosz & Zawacz!:i, 
1987:189). The classification of private farming poses 
certain prcblerr.s fer the Marxist legal experts. As we sh~:::..1 
later observe, the capitalist label is totally unacceptable 
because of the doctrinal reasons of the Marxist-Leninist 
state. On the other hand, the classification of Polish 
farmers as smallholders may only be the first step towards 
the integration of individual farming into the socialist 
economy managed by the state. 
It is not hard to notice the basic contradiction 
between the communist doctrine, 
Poland, and the constitutional guarantees for the private 
farming. The latter are a product of the indigenous socio-
economic conditions which do not seem to evolve the way t~e 
Marxist ideologues and the framers of the 195~ Constit~ticn 
intended. Despite the fact that the prec~rious position cf 
individual ownership in all economic spheres, not only the 
agriculture, is evident from the above argument, certain 
legal changes were eventually ~ade in favor of the private 
far~ing. In 1983 the special status of Polish fa~ily far~ 
was acknowledged 
amendment. 
the constitution by one significant 
Article 15, paragraph 3, was changed to provide a 
guarantee for family farm as the lasting element of the 
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polish socio-economic structure. This amendment c~me about 
as a result of a prolonged debate in the Sejm and within the 
PUWP. The party and the government supposedly acted on the 
request from the United Peasant Party. Also the influence of 
the worker and peasant independent movements during 1980/8! 
cannot be overlooked here as a crucial factor in inf luencin; 
party policy. u 
Two recent tendencies in the constitutional regulation 
of Poland's private farming can be distinguished. One cf 
them, formulated in 1976, is based on the premise that 
constitution confirms the e:{isting social structure in 
to transform it" (Sokolewicz, 1978:56). !n the agricultur~: 
sphere this means that whi the state accepts the role cf 
private farming in the country's economy, it is not willing 
to abandon its ultimate goal of total socialist transfcrma-
tion of Polish village. The state enhances its position as 
the main agent of change and the representative of the 
working class and the nation as a whole. 
The tendency to identify national interest of Pclari~ 
with the socialist goa~s became very pronounced i~ the 
Policy d~ring the 1970s. It also fc~~d its reflectic~ 
i:i"''!'~·.'!'~ 
..... ....,;, ... 
- ~ 
........ 
t~e agricu!tu=al sphere. The te~porary accepta~ce ~f ~~e 
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status quo was accompanied by a long-run plan to reduce the 
agriculture to the role of a relatively marginal sector ~n a 
mostly socialized economy (Korbonsk~, 1981:277). 
Under the pressure of the social unrest in 1930-81 and 
the deteriorating eccnomic conditions in agricultural 
production, the party approach to the constitutional position 
of private farrr.ir.g was altered. This change was eventually 
reflected in the constitutional amendment (art.15 par.Ji. 
Also the whole interpretation of property ownership in the 
countryside and the relations of production on the farms hac 
to be changed as well, in order to suit the demands of the 
doctrine. 
A comprehensive analysis of this new approach to th~ 
private farming in the Polish socio-economic structars is 
presented by a Polish legal scholar Kazimierz Strozc=yk 
(1937). Stro=czyk attempts to reconcile the new legal stat~s 
of a family farm, express by the amended art.15 par.3 c! 
the Constitation, with the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and 
those provisions of the state law whi~h adhere to the 
phasi::es the difference between a family farm and a 
The f or~er t~=~ ra!ers s~aci!ically t6 __ ...,.'.".:)_"I'- ...... .::--~~ ~ • .t.w\.;;;;.-1:"- _...;...;;; 
which is run exclusively by members of a peasant fa=ily. 
Far=s which e~ploy outside help, according to St=o===7J:, ~=e 
e~cluded from state protection. 
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The Polish scholar also points out that farm land and 
means of production in the countryside can, under certain 
circumstances be considered "personal property" of a peasant 
family, (art. 132 par. 2 of the Polish Civil Code) (72-
73). Also in this case farmers would be additionally 
protected by art.18 of the Constitution. This article 
declares that "Polish Peeples' Republic guarantees ccmplete 
protection and a right to inheritance of the personal 
property of the citizens". Strozczyk refers here mainly t~ 
silialler holdings, while most private farms are still 
considered "individual property", protected constitutionall7 
as far as they are supported solely by the work of single 
family members (72-74). The size of such farm, he suggests, 
should only be determined by economic factors. The ad-
ministrative norms set by the 1944 Land Reform Act still 
prohibit private ownership of larger farms. 
that the legal significance of this "outdated", but 
binding law, is offset by the reality. Holdings in excess of 
fifteen hectares constitute only about six percent cf a:: 
individual farms in Poland (75). 
T~e au~hor of th~s article acknowledges that ~n~e= 
present state law the socialized property is assur~a a 
prominent position in Poland's socio-economic structur~. 
This concerns the special protection granted the state f ar~s 
(art.12 par.1) and peasant cooperatives (art.16 an~ a=t.15 
par. -l) • Strozczyk also stresses that "tha family far~ cann~t 
be considered a part of the socialist economic system under 
article 11 of the constitution"{75J. 
Nevertheless, the scholar proceeds to argue that since 
family farms are based solely on the work of fanily members, 
not hired labor force, this very fact is the "basic explana-
tion for the principle of lasting guarantees [grantad to 
this form of ownership] in the Polish socio-economic struc-
ture"{76). The new agricultural policy in the view of the 
constitutional amendment is supposed to be directed towards 
providing adequate protection only to this particular form of 
ownership. Strozczyk adds that it should lead to grantin; 
family farm equal legal status, compatible to one possessec 
by the nationalized and cooperative sectors. 
Since the advanced procass of socialization of 
prcduction in Polish villages is a recognized fact, the 
scholar suggests that family farming in Poland "has 
characteristics of private eccncrny"(73). This argu=ent 
. . f. s:..;n::.. :..es an attempt on the part of ~arxist la;al schol3rs 
Poland to justify the continued existence of an indepen=ent 
eco~o~ic sector in a co~~unist country. 
appear as a permanent feature cf the socialist eccnorn~ ~hi=h 
coexists with the process of socio-economic transforrnatic~ 
instead of obstr~cting it. 
Whatever the doctrinal argument ~ay be in thi~ ~a~~. 
sc:e independent scholars also point out that the overa:l 
process of social~st tra~sf or~aticn i~ t~c Pclish 
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has had strong influence on the traditional value system of 
the peasant. Already in the 1970s, "the regime found itself 
in the position to socialize agriculture without antagcnizin~ 
the majority of the villagers" (Korbinski, 1981:290). 
In the 1980s, the percentage of village population 
Poland is still significant.ts Agriculture remains a vital 
part of the cc~ntry's economy. However, the prcpcsals fo~ 
future constitutional change towards "greater equalization 
among different sectors in agriculture" (Strozczyk,1987:79) 
s~ould be viewed in the context of the changing social 
situation. It entails the escape of younger generaticn 
the countryside, continuous fragmentation of land etc. ':'his/ 
in combination with the changing value system, makes way 
faster integration of family farms into the socialist 
econoI:1y. Judging from the poor economic performance cf 
Polish agriculture since 1977, this process is not only 
difficult to justify in terms of the party doctrine ~hi=h 
cannot be supported by even lower productivity of thz 
sccialized sector. The new approach to family 
1980s so far has not brought visible improvements in th8 
Polish agric~lture either. 17 
~he problem of incompatibility between the privata 
econo~y, which rr.ust struggle for survival, and th~ legal 
preference given t~ the socialized or state-owned sector 
jespita the rs~ent atts~pts at providi~g ~ore clsar cc~sti~~-
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tional regulation in this area. The program of socialist 
transformation, however, which is reflected in the Constitu-
tion, cannot be viewed in isolation from the specific Polish 
political and socio-economic conditions. 
The PtJWP leaC.ership has tried several ti::ies to 
reconcile the Marxist-Leninist ideology with the practice of 
governing the country where certain powerful social fact::::rs 
constantly resist change. In order to overcome these 
difficulties, the legal framework conceived by the comm~nist 
regime, from the beginning was intended either to exclude er 
coopt the hostile social, political and economic groups er 
classes, as the Marxists prefer to call the~. T~e resis-
tance to the system has for a long time been based on the 
claim that the proposed changes in politics and economy Qre 
incompatible with the Polish conditions. 18 
While the policy of exclusion and denial of legal 
status was conducted against certain religious and econcm~= 
groups, especially during the Stalinist period, at the same 
t~~e, t~e whole concept of legal political cppositi=~ ~s ~ 
"f::ee play of political fore es" ~;as eli~ina ted. :r:: ti: : 9 S 5 
~espite some protection prc7ided by art.10 cf the ,_ ___ ..... .! ........ _ --··~'-"'- .... ...... 
tior. and the 19~4 Land Reform Act, which promised 
d~stri=aticr. to private peasa~ts, the ca=paig~ 
liquidating the privately owned land was under way in Poland. 
Befo:::-e the 1980 workers' revolt, the Pt:~JP ::-.anc:.g.:;d t:::: 
avoid detailed constitutional regulation of the state-Ch~rch 
relations and the status of many newly emerged independer..t 
social groups. While the peasants succeeded in ac~uiring 
some sort of a legal guarantee in 1983, the Jaruzelski re~i~e 
has opted once again to find a substitute for reform in t~e 
other areas. 
The 1982 and 1983 consti~utional changes (the creation 
of two Tribunals and the PRON) are technically designed tc 
safeguard the law and protect the citizens from the viola-
tions on the part of the state administration. However, 
these moves also signify the new attempts to revitalize the 
"Third Force", preventing in this way any independent 
interpretation of the constitutional freedoms by the 
opposition. 
The gains of the private farmers also ha~e t~ be 
analyzed in the context of long term policy of the party. 
The exclusion of non-family farms from constitutional 
p:::otectior.. raise ..... cer1..a:::..n doubts as to the actual inte::~icr:..s 
of the party leadership. The preference for the socia:i=~~ 
sector continues to determine the party economic policy an= 
the main goal for today appears to be greater depen~en~y ~= 
the family farms en the state administration, 
a!lowing it to become a core of a revitalized and i~de~2~a~nt 
agricultural sector. Reacent renewal cf talks with the 
Church on private funding for Polish agriculture provijes, 
however, at least sone hope for the futu=e. 
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Since 1956, when the Stalinist mcdel of socio-econc:ic 
transformation was abandoned in Poland, we can notice a 
tendency in the Polish constitutional practice towards a 
national road to socialism. The Marxist scholars now openly 
ad:it the existence of f orrner "wrong" tendencies towards 
uniformization of structural solutions, modelled on th~ 
soviet 1935 Constitution" during the 1950s. (Ja=osz £ 
Zawadzki, 1987:88). These authors also point out that "the 
briefness and the high degree of abstraction in the Polish 
Constitution created a situation where even profound systeci= 
changes, including those concerning the functioning of the 
state organs, could be conducted to a large extent outside 
the constitution, without introducing amendments in the text 
itself" (92). 
This situation lasted until 1976 when Poland was 
C.eclar the naticnally united state at the stage of ~~i:~ir.~ 
. , . 
socia .... ism. The national character of the Polish state f our.d 
its expression in the constituticnal revision. 
intended to project an image of political and moral unit7. 
:n such a state there was no roe~ n6t cnly fer pclitical 
opposition, but also for an extended role of tha Chu=ch as a~ 
~enevolant ally of the regime. ~he existence o~ basic 
agree~ent between the state and the Cathclic Church was 
simply taken for granted (Chrypi:ski, 1931.: :!56). a.., ... -
national state o! the ~orking peo~le" was declared a 
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"continuation of the previous state based en the dictatorship 
of the proletariat" (Sokolewicz, 1978:49). It was backed by 
a clai= that "the sovereign Polish state can be strong only 
as a socialist state" (51). In consequence the national 
interest of the Pcl~s becarr.e identified with that of the 
working class (40-41). This denial of ideological and 
socio-econc~ic conflict was accompanied by a new ezpressicn 
of national symbolism. Art.103, paragraph 3, was added to 
the Constitution, officially recognizing the original Polis~ 
national anthem. Additional protection for the national 
sy=bols was included in the new art. 104. 
The evolution towards a national version of Polish 
• , • +- • 
socia~ism con~~nues throughout the 1980s. On one hand, we 
have to acknowledge that certain specific domastic conditicn~ 
are gi~en greater consideration by the party leadershi~. 
But, it is too early to claim that the Marxist-Leninist 
system in Poland has finally corr.e to terms with the inde~an-
dent Church, the political opposition or even family farming. 
So far the constitutional changes do not indicate any radical 
departure from the previous methods of only temporary 
The conte~porary situation of the Polish soci~l~~t 
system can also be looked upcn from another perspecti7e. 
Cekalski and Litynski ar;ue that "the nationalization cf 
socialis= ~ea~s ~ot or.ly the reconcil!aticn ~it~ ___ ..... ..:~--~ • .1r.c:-. .... -- ..., .... c...-
peculiarities, but also a deeper entrenchment of th:= 
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in society, precisely due to the rejection cf the most 
striking features of the anti-national symbolism" {58). 
A more optimistic outlook on the systemic evolution --.......... 
Poland may be based on the observation that "neither private 
agriculture, nor tolerance of the Church's role [ ... ] nor 
freedom of foreign travel (art.89) 1 9, nor the support for 
private handicraft and franchise in commerce belong to t~e 
typical features of the [communist] system. [These f satu:::;s] 
make it more susceptible to future evolution"{Najder, 1932 
: 76) • 
At present, it is very difficult to determine the 
future of Polish constitutional changes and whether or not 
the state law will slowly evolve away from the funda=.~ntal~ 
of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Nevertheless, it must 
ac}:nowledged that since the system of communist rule has 
existe4 in the country already for about 45 years, influan-
cing the value systems and the reality of socio-econo:ic 
conditions, the position of the Church, independent cppcsi-
tion or private agriculture in Poland in the forseea~le 
f~ture may never approach legal status ccmparable with 
Western democratic systems. 
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NOTES 
1. See Markiewicz (1984) for a detailed discussion of the 
role of minority religious in contemporary Poland. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
.., 
I• 
3 . 
Since 1956, the Polish government has established a 
practice of regular meetings between its representatives 
and the delegates of the episcopate. 
The constitutional focus of this study does not allow 
more space for discussion of the Pope, John Paul II's 
influence on the Church-state relations in Poland. 
This proposal sounds in fact like an echo of the 
articles 6 and 7 par. 1 of the 1935 Constitution. 
See recent articles in the official PUWP weekly 
Polityka, for example: Passent, D.",Centrysci podr.csz~ 
glow~", Polityka , No 44, 1987. 
The Polish United Workers' Party, The Peasant Party and 
the Democratic Alliance. Similar system consisting of 
two or more allied parties exists in six other communist 
countries: Czechoslovakia, GDR, Bulgaria, North Korea 
Vietnam, and the People's Republic of China. 
Some more radical organizations such as the Confeder 
ation for Independent Poland (Konfederacja Polski :rie~c 
dlegiej-KPN) call for full political independence 
and totally reject the present system. 
Jerzy Zawieyski. He was one of the most pro:inent post-
war Catholic politicians in Poland. Unable to withstand 
political pressure from the communists he withdrew f~o= 
government in late 1970s. Later committed s~i=ide. 
9. For detailed documentation on Polish opposition se~ 
Raina (1981). 
10. The Ombudsman's office was actually created in Poland 
in 1987. 
11. After the split within the "Znak" group in the :id-197Qs 
the pro-communist faction continued its activities 
under the same name. It was labeled "neo-Znak" by the 
independent Catholic activists who resigned fro: 
participation in government. 
12. For example the pro-Solidarity leadership of PAX 
associaticn was purged in 1982. 
1J. See for examplee Kaminski A. "Dialog Posredni". In 
Polityka, No. 31, 1988. 
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14. Also independent Catholic activists have won over the 
recent years some advisory role in the socio-economic 
sphere, exercised through the Social Council of the 
Polish Primate. 
15~ For discussions on contemporary agricultural issues and 
reform see Bedkowski, L. "Odcienie zieleni", Polityk~. 
Ho. 12, 1988. 
16. Polish village population in 1975 constituted 44.3 
percent of the total in l987 - 39.5 perce~t. {R=c=niJ: 
Statystyczny 1987, Warszawa, GZowny Urz~d Statystyc=ny). 
17. The 1986 data shows only slight improvement in grain 
production in comparison with the average output durin~ 
1976-1980. The total number of farm animals {cattle, 
pigs, sheep and horses) actually declined by mora t~an 
10 percent. (See !bid.) 
18. See Rybicki et al. {1977) Sejm Ustawodawczy Rzeczpo 
tej Polskiej 1947-52, for the information on political 
and economic influences during the constitutional 
debate in the 1950s. 
19. Due to the fact that Poland has had for many years t~a 
mcst liberal passport policy in the Soviet bloc, tr.a 
1976 revision of the Constitution provided for sp;cial 
protection by the country's diplomatic and ccns~lar 
service, to which the Polish citizens residing abroad 
are entitled (art. 89). 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
From the standpoint of a contemporary observer, the 
Constitution of the People's Republic of Poland may seem to 
play a rather marginal role in the protracted political and 
socio-economic crisis, besieging the country during the 
1980s. A persistent question remains, however, what the 
future holds for the nation and the state. The 1952 
political and economic ~tructure could appear very much 
outdated at present, but the fundamental principles cf the 
systeili, which are contained in it cannot be disposed with, 
due to Poland's crucial position in the Soviet bloc. 
A closer loo~ at the Polish constitutiqnal traditicn 
~ay allow us to see t~o important tendencies in the develop-
ment of the country's political structure. Since 1913 (the 
year of regaining independence), the evolution of the 
constitutional order has been either nation-oriented er 
-oriented. 
One important external factor, the location of Poland 
~n E~~ope between Russia and Germany, has .: ...,,.c., .... _ 
--·- _ ..... 
encing politics in that country. Associated with this is the 
strong feeling of national identity which helped the Poles 
survive the period of foreign rule throughout the 19th 
century. 
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The nation-oriented program of Rcman Drnowski saw 
strength of Poland in building a political system where the 
ethnic Poles would domin~te all spheres of life. He hoped 
that through a parliamentary victory his party would be abl8 
to gain sufficient majority and proceed to establish a state 
for, and ruled by, the ethnic Poles who only by strengthen-
ing the national ties supposedly were able to resist foreign 
threat. The 1921 Constitution was not the ideal sol~tion 
omowski, but it could be used as a means to an end. 
A more idealistic plan was envisioned by Josef 
Pilsudski. The 1935 Constitution reflected his state-
oriented attitude. Even after the collapse of his fede=alist 
, . 
p~ans in Eastern and Central Europe, Pilsudski locked at 
strong, multinational Polish state as a necessary prere-
quisite fer the country's lasting independence as well as t~e 
national survival. The state organization, accordin; to ~is 
followers, was to be based on the authoritarian methods of 
rule, with the parliament (Sejrn) remaining in the shadow of a 
strong president. The theory cf solidarity between t~e 
citizens and the state along with the syndicalist system of 
participation were meant to serve the common geed-a 3tron; 
P·~lish state. 
After World War II the internal and external variables 
influencing the new emerging political system were altered 
dramatically. Poland found itself in the sphere of influence 
of j~st one of its two powerful, historical neighbors - t~e 
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soviet Union. This type of foreign domination resulted not 
only in political influence, but brought with itself an 
ideology which was to determine the future of the state 
structure and the whole society. 
During the last 44 years of the communist rule the 
concepts of the Polish nation and the Polish state had to 
reconciled with the demands of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. 
The Communist party in its propaganda chose to identify 
new ideology with the "progressive" tendencies 
of the Polish nation. The whole preamble to the 1952 
Constitution is in fact devoted to this idea. At the sama 
time, the preamble stresses that the Polish state 
democracy represents primarily not the nation as s~ch, =~t 
"the interest and desires of the widest masses of people". 
During the period of open political crisis, howeve=, 
the party had to realize that neither the nation as a whcl~ 
nor the "wide masses of the working people" are willing tc 
grant legitimacy to the foreign imposed and ideologi~all~ 
a:ien regime. The dismal reccrd of economic performance 
the failure to realize promises of an equal, egalitarian 
society ~ace it even ilicre dif!icult for the co=~unists ~-
:::ai:itain =11n.1::1Um 
support. Then, it was the concept of a sovereign Palis~ 
state which could be used as a rallying ground for t~~ 
--..!: ~ ...... -
pecple w~o strongly resisted all fo~ei~n (Soviet) elenents 
in the present system. 
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In 1956-57, the party first secretary Go~~!ka ma~a~ed 
to convince the Polish people that the state, ruled by the 
party he represented was the only alternative to the Soviet 
occupation. In 1976, however, the PUWP returned to the 
concept of the unity of interest that supposedly charac-
terized the working class (perceived in the Marxist-Leninist 
terms), and the Polish nation as a whole. In the 1970s, the 
values of socialism were widely accepted in Polosh socist7. 
Nevertheless, the people did not believe that these were 
being applied by the regime (Mason, 1985:74). The social 
unrest during the 1980s brought about profound char.ges 
Polish society's value system, which was marked by the 
drastic decline of support for socialism (236). 
Jaruzelski government, mainly by the way of legal and 
constitutional reforms, chose to emphasize strong stat; 
organization that according to the communists on Decsmter 
1981 was delivered from anarchy and a threat tc its sc7er-
eignty. 
The role of constitution in the communist systam of 
Poland can be viewed differently from the standpcin~ of 
"I..., 
J.. _, I 
ruling party and its ideology than from the position of the 
independent social movements within the society. 
legitimacy appears to be only one, by no means the most 
important, =~ncticn of the charter. According to the 
Marxist-Leninist doct~ine, the laws of historical determinism 
and t~e socio-economic develc~~ent derived !rem t~e=, st3~d 
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above any constitutional reg~lation. The party draws 
legitimacy from the principle of its leading role and the 
working people's consensus mandated by these laws. 
The charter as such, constitutes a specific funda~en-
tal and general programmatic platform on which the future of 
the country's development is to be built. The party 
maintains its position as the leading social force, deter=in-
ing the future of state and national development. It manages 
to exercise its role via the "transmission belts" of the 
other two political parties and the network of controlled 
organizations, without necessarily monopolizing all social 
activity in an official one-party structure. 
In Poland,. the prograilimatic function of the constit~-
tion has for many years overshadowed its legal si;n~ficance. 
At first, the Stalinist doctrine of people's democracy, 
the idea of a nation-oriented socialist state, ca:::le to 
deter=ine the direction of constitutional develcpilient. 
identifying the function of the state organization with 
realization of their political and . . socic-ecc~c=::.c: 
Poli.sh co:::imunists managed to write their ideolo·g:t· in to 
':'he new "socialist law" was meant to l:e de!:ined 
.., - ... 
.-.....:t..-J. 
according to the doctrinal standards in disregard to an7 
i~~ependent verificaticu by a constitutior.al t=ib~na! =r 
other judicial institution. The passing of the new constit~-
tional responsibility laws in the early 1980s served the 
purpose of emphasizing a different approach to legality ~Y 
the Jaruzelski regime. There is little evidence, however, 
that the practical significance of the new institutions 
constitutional Tribunal, the Tribunal of State} is able 
154 
alter the actual process of decision-making within the stat:: 
and party apparatus, which rarely takes constitutional 
constraints into consideration. 
Another function of the constitution in communist 
Poland - education or socialization of the people has largel7 
proved a failure, especially during recent years. In 1975-
75, during the widespread protests against the authoritati7e 
constitutional amendments, there was some attachment still in 
evidence to the charter as a symbol of national soverei~nty 
(Ral:owska-Harmstone et al, 1984:68). In the 1980s, hcwe·;~::, 
there has been growing dissatisfaction with the system and 
even the very socialist f oundaticns which are e:~:pressed 
the programmatic articles of the Constitution a:.:-e :r.o;;r 
distrusted c= openly rejected by the large se~~ents o! tte 
public opinion (Mason, 1985:228, 233-248}. While any 
plausible alternatives are absent due to the gsopoliti~al 
situation of Poland, apathy and discontent become widesprea~. 
~~e cc~.r:iunist autho=ities on thei~ pa=t, e~gage in f~ti!e 
sear~h for means to rejuvenate t~e political and ~o~io-
aconomic system, still based en the outdatsd Stalinist 
~onstitutional modal. 
It may be argued that at present time 
Constitution see=s to be a rather deficie~~ s~~~c: t~a~ ~ 
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real basis of the ccrr.rr.~nist hold en power in Poland. ~he 
Polish government leaders mere often cite the country's 
position in the bloc as its "raison d'etat" and the main 
reason why the nation should come to terms with the program 
of reforms led by the PUWP. 
Under such circumstances the future cf the constitu-
tion remains uncertain. The development cf the basic law 
could evolve in at least two different directions. Thz 
decline cf official ideology, which according to H~ntington 
(1970) is a characteristic of "consolidated one-party 
systems" is already a fact. Since 1982, the Jaruze::..sJ:i 
regime opted for the constitutional status quo with onl7 
miner changes designed to strengthen the pcsition of the 
authorities and their image as a "law abiding" rsgime, =aths= 
than revising the whole basic law. 
Among the Polish legal community, however, thsre are 
sc~e voices which interp~et Jaruzelslti's intentio~s as a ~ea: 
desire for more fundamental constitutional reforms. 
(1937) analyzes the programmatic articles of the 1952 
Constitution from the standpoint of their lega::.. and ideolcgi-
ca::.. significance. According to him, the drafters cf th~ 
:-eal legal !:1eani::.g, not only "an interp::eta.t.i-~7e di::e·=ti. ... \(·:;" c: 
the system's development. Kubiak adds that "the ad:ncwledge-
ment cf the 1952 Constitution as primarily a legal doc~ment 
is possible i:-i spite of its widely J::-icw:i short:: =-=:-.in.gs" I '°' ('.l I t. - _., I • 
156 
The interpretation cf the constitution as a legal 
docuDent is pointing out in the direction of the future 
development towards the goals of "socialist democracy" and a 
"greater realization of citizen's freedoms and rights" 
Poland. Kubiak seems to agree that this should be the basis 
for the future constitutional revision supervised by the 
constitutional Tribunal. He does not challenge the fundamen-
tals of the system but he is aware of the fact that so=e 
"regressive" legislation has already been passed in the 
recent years thus putting in doubt the whole idea of an 
evolutionary change in the constitutional practice towards 
greater "social self-rule", a phenomenon apparently in 
evidence since 1931. He points cut the examples of 
backward legislation: passing the new higher edu~ation la~. 
and the 1985 law on the extraordinary legal respcnsibilit7. 
Whether constitutional changes will be kapt in check 
under the present status quo or the Jaruzelski ragima allows 
some more profound revision of tha basic law, in both cas3s 
it appears unlikely that the fundamentals cf the 
___ .,....., __ ,"!_..; _ ... 
............................... _.;;;. '-
system will be altered in any meaningful way. A progra~ of 
"social=.st rer..awal" may replace the outdated idea o:: :;;so;::z'.:;: 
~3~ocracy and the sociali3t national ..., ,.... ~ ~ ,- -"'.'•..: , --
--...,;; .... ...:. ,...-:0, v --.1. 
indebted to the Soviet model. 
The decline of ideology, however, makes it more 
C.::.fficult fo::::- the PUWP to :maintain its leading positicn 
sociaty. Its function :may eventually be raduc;d to that o: a 
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recruitment pool only, for the purpose of filling the 
governmental and administrative posts at the top cf the 
hierarchy with the loyal individuals. Ncn-communists already 
are being accepted to some lesser advisory or consultative 
positions in the decision-making process. 
The growing importance of the indigenous alaments in 
the Polish political and socio-economic structure is evident 
even in the contemporary version of the constitution. 
may pose a much greater problem for the Polish communists 
the future. Unwilling to acknowledge the legal exiptence 
the independent Catholic Church and the autonomous social 
groups in the narrowly conceived constitutional frama~crk, 
the PUWP leaders of Poland may be forced to lock for c:. me:::,;: 
lasting modus vivendi, guaranteed by a political agraemant 
instead of any new provisions in the basic law. 
So far tne .Jaruzelski regime has offered only 3o~e 
consultative voice in government affairs to the opposition. 
~1i~dful of the l9S1 ~artial law that vio!atsd the :9S~ 
"social accords" signed at Gdahs::, Szczecin anC. .Jastr=F':!:::...:;:, 
the independent activists, in their ~ajcrity, =e~ai~ s~z~~-
:::..cus and ::cs~ 
~eaningful legal guara~tees. 
The 1952 Constitution which nominally 
., .: .,,. .-. , -- ..... .:. , ., 
--.t•C•.J. •\r---
of a sovereign st.a ta, also can be perce::v~C. as a s:r:=.bc-:. ~= c.. 
co:wpromised Stalinist state organi:;::ation, ;;hi::::h was cnl::l 
:.ss 
=argi~al~y affected by the 1975 . . re~Tis:..cn. The Polish 
political culture with its "non-democratic, elitist, 
egalitarian and particularistic values" (Rakowska-Harmstone 
et al., 1984:64) may prove to be a tough barrier against a 
more complex reform of the system in addition to all the 
systemic and external variables mentioned above. The 
distrust of the communists who at present are the 
capable of instituting political reforms, coincides with th~ 
popular attachment to the legal status quo which gives the 
state a special responsibility for nation's welfare. ~!::st 
likely the next decade will show whether the changes 
belief and value systems that occurred during the 1980s, 
combination with the active intellectuals', workers', a~! 
peasant pressure groups can push the communist syste~ ~-
Pola~d in the direction of democratic ccnstituticnal refer~. 
:t all ultimately depends on tha international climat~ in 
Eastern Eu=cpe as a w~ole. It re~ains to seer:. if t!:e 
Polish developments can be reconciled with Gorbachev's 
o: "de.mocratizaticn" and "se:.f-determination" c: a "I "I ...... 
socialist [emphasis added] members of the bloc. 
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APPEUDIX O?rE 
CONSTITUTIO?JAL DEVELOPMENT IN EASTER?! EUROPE 
Constitution 
Country Modified 
Pre-War Inter:nediate Stalinist 
Bulgaria 1944 C:::.897) 1947 
:rungary 1946 l949 
Ru:::iania 1944 {1923) 195:: 
Poland 1947 (1921) 1952 
Czechoslovakia 1945 (l920) 1948 l960 
Source: Jedruch, J. (1982) Constitutions, Electic~s a~d 
Legislatures of Poland 1493-1977. A Guide to Th3ir 
History. Washington D.C.: University Press .of A:::.e::::-ic~ 
Inc. p.404. · 
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APPENDIX TWO 
NUMBER OF SEJM L°EGISLATIVE ACTS PASSED AND COUNCIL OF STATE 
DECREES CONFIRMED (1952-1985) 
TERM LEGISLATION DECREES 
I (1952-1956) 42 161. 
II (1957-1961) 174 13 
III (1961-1965) 93 1 ..... 
IV (1965-1968) 60 1 ..... 
v (1969-1972) 36 
V'! (1972-1976) lOJ 1: 
'1'1'T'? (3/21,1976 - 2/28,l<:l73) 34 J ., _.._ 
~1:r (March 1980-August 1985) 203 6 
Source: 
cyjne. 
Jarosz, Z. an~ Zawadzki, S. (1987) P=awo Konst7t~ 
Warsaw: Pahstowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe. p. 335 
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APPENDIX THREE 
CLASS COMPOSITION OF THE POLISH SOCIETY 
1938 1983 
Classes and Social Strata percent 
Landowners 0.5 
:Scurgecis 2.0 
Working Class 29.0 46.7 
Peasantry 52.0 24.9 
White Collar Workers 5.5 23.S 
Petty Bourgeois 11.0 ~.8 
Total 100.0 lCC.O 
Source: 
cvjne. 
Jarosz, 
Warsaw: 
Z. and Zawadzki, S. (1937) =P=r~a~w~o'--"?~~=~~=--~~~t_y~t---~ 
Pahstwowe Wyda~mictwo :Uau}:owe. 
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APPENDIX FOUR 
MAJOR COMSTITUTIO?IAL DEVELOPMEUTS nr THE PEOPLE. s REPUBLIC CF 
POLAND 1952-1988 
Date A:mendment/Revisicn 
1952 Constitution passed 
1957 The Supreme Chamber of Ccntrol 
(Uajwyzsza Izba Kontroli - NIK) 
duced as a state organ subcrdi~ated 
to the Sej:m 
1960 The number cf Sej:m deputies set at 
460. (For:merly one deput::; p;;r 60,008 
population was elected) 
1961 Coun=il of State enlarged 
to eleven :members 
1972, 1973 Changes pertaining to the 
and 1975 territorial division and the state 
administration. 
1976 Ccnstitutional r s::..cr. 
* leading role of PU~IP 
* The Supre~e Chamber cf Control {~I~) 
subordinated to the Council of 
~·1inisters 
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APPENDIX FOUR cont. 
MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS DI THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 
POLAND 
Date 
1976 
1980 
1982 
Amendment/Revision 
Constitutional revision (cont.) 
* Poland declared a socialist 
the working people 
* development of socialist de:ccr~c7 
* Sejm empowered to pass declarations 
about the ge~eral directicn cf 
socio-economic development 
* foreign policy directives: 
ship with the USSR 
* constitutionalisaticn 
~ .... .: ,-,- ~­
~- _; ..... -
of National Unity (Front Jadnc~c 1 
Narodu - FJN) 
I '>TT '7' I 
\. ..... _."'' 
returned under the Sejc supervision 
State intrcd~ced 
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APPEND:x FOUR cont. 
MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS nr THE PEOPLE' s REPUBL::!:C 
POLAND 
Date A~endment/Revisicn 
1983 Replacecent of the Fro:t of Nationa: 
Unity (FJN) with the Patriotic Mcve-
ment for National Rebirth (Patrio-
tyczny Ruch Odrodzenia Harcdowagc -
PRON). 
Working class role conf ir:::ted as tha 
main social force i~ the political 
syste:::t. 
State of emergency law intro-
duced. 
element of the socialist eccnc=y 
Poland. 
1987 Referendum included in the text as 
an expression of the "working people's 
will". 
1988 Fiscal autonomy for provincial 
People's Councils. 
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